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We consider a problem of prediction based on opinions elicited from heterogeneous rational agents with
private information. Making an accurate prediction with a minimal cost requires a joint design of the incentive
mechanism and the prediction algorithm. Such a problem lies at the nexus of statistical learning theory and
game theory, and arises in many domains such as consumer surveys and mobile crowdsourcing. In order to
elicit heterogeneous agents’ private information and incentivize agents with different capabilities to act in
the principal’s best interest, we design an optimal joint incentive mechanism and prediction algorithm called
COPE (COst and Prediction Elicitation), the analysis of which offers several valuable engineering insights.
First, when the costs incurred by the agents are linear in the exerted effort, COPE corresponds to a “crowd
contending” mechanism, where the principal only employs the agent with the highest capability. Second,
when the costs are quadratic, COPE corresponds to a “crowd-sourcing” mechanism that employs multiple
agents with different capabilities at the same time. Numerical simulations show that COPE improves the
principal’s profit and the network profit significantly (larger than 30% in our simulations), comparing to
those mechanisms that assume all agents have equal capabilities.
Key words : mechanism design, aggregated prediction, crowdsourcing
1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Motivations
Prediction markets, which aggregate information elicited from people with private beliefs, have
served as a reliable tool for estimating the outcome of specific future events (see Berg and Rietz
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(2003)). For example, these markets have been used to predict the winners of election (see Wolfers
and Rothschild (2011)), future demand for a product (see Hayes (1998)), and stock prices and
returns (see Gottschlich and Hinz (2014)). In these markets, values of traded information depend
on future outcomes, and the accuracy of prediction can be verified based on the realized outcomes.
With the emergence of several commercial crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk and Microworkers, collecting information from people to make prediction has become much
cheaper, easier and faster. However, the information collected from people (“the agents”) can be
highly unreliable due to the agents’ insufficient expertise and the lack of appropriate incentives.
More specifically, in a crowdsourcing platform, the agents are heterogeneous as they come from
different countries and have different skills, which leads to significant variations of the work quality
(see Karger et al. (2014)). Furthermore, agents may exert different levels of effort to finish the
allocated task based on different levels of payments, and different agents may react differently to
the same level of payment (see Liu et al. (2014)). The chosen level of effort affects their performance
dramatically. Due to these issues, an appropriate incentive mechanism that exploits the agents’
heterogeneity whilst incentivizes appropriate effort levels is crucial to a successful prediction system.
Besides eliciting high quality of information, the prediction performance also depends on the
prediction behaviour of the surveyor (“the principal”). Without an appropriate prediction rule,
the principal may not be able to effectively utilize the collected information and may obtain an
inaccurate prediction results. This motivates us to study the incentive mechanism design together
with the prediction rule optimization.
The resultant problem of joint design poses a significant challenge due to the following reasons.
First, due to the incorporation of the prediction problem, the objective of incentive mechanism
changes from eliciting agents’ information truthfully to minimizing the prediction error. As the
prediction error is a result of the agents’ information and actions, the designed mechanisms not
only needs to motivate agents to report their truthful estimation information, but also needs to
make sure that agents take appropriate actions. Hence, we cannot directly implement existing
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strictly proper scoring rules, e.g., the quadratic scoring rule (see Brier (1950), Selten (1998)), that
only promotes truthfulness among agents to address the joint problem.
Second, the designed mechanism needs to solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems
simultaneously. Moral hazard results from the inability of the principal to observe an agent’s
actions (i.e., effort exerted by the agent), while adverse selection corresponds to the inability of
knowing an agent’s private information (i.e., the expertise of an agent). This is different from most
incentive mechanisms designed in the existing works, which separate the mechanism design from
the prediction problem and address either “hidden actions” (i.e., moral hazard) (see e.g., Fang
et al. (2007), Ioannidis and Loiseau (2013)) or “hidden information” (i.e., adverse selection) (see
e.g., Frongillo et al. (2015), Abernethy et al. (2015)).
Nevertheless, we formulate and optimally solve a “parametric” form of this joint design problem.
More specifically, the principal desires to predict a parameter of a known distribution. Each agent
is modeled in a parametric fashion, with her expertise governed by a single parameter that is the
agent’s private information. We assume that agents are heterogeneous as they have different levels
of expertise. While each agent aims to maximize her own expected payoff (i.e., the revenue minus
the effort cost), the principal optimizes a joint utility that trades off the prediction error and the
monetary costs. For ease of exposition, we refer to the principal as “she” and each agent as “he”.
1.2. Results and Contributions
We focus on the interactions among a principal and multiple agents, and design an appropri-
ate incentive mechanism to facilitate the parametric prediction process. Specifically, we design a
mechanism, which we call “COPE” (standing for “COst and Prediction Elicitation”), that jointly
optimizes the principal’s payoff in terms of the payments made to the agents and the prediction
error incurred. COPE provides a systematic way for the principal to incentivize all participating
agents to report their estimations truthfully and exert appropriate amounts of effort based on their
respective capabilities.
We summarize our key results and the main contributions as follows.
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• Theoretic significance: We relax several critical assumptions that are common in papers in the
related literature, i.e., the costs incurred by the agents are all known to the principal, the agents do
not incur costs for efforts, and the agents are all homogeneous. Hence, the proposed model pushes
this line of theoretical focused research into more realistic settings.
• Optimal incentive mechanism design: We study a generic incentive mechanism design problem
situated in a prediction process. To study the optimal prediction solution, we design the COPE
mechanism, which ensures that all participating agents report their estimations truthfully and
exert appropriate amounts of effort based on their respective capabilities, meanwhile maximizes
the principal’s expected payoff.
• Observations and insights: Our results show that, with Gaussian estimation noise, when the
agent’s marginal cost is independent of his amount of exerted effort, the principal should conduct
a crowd-tender mechanism, by soliciting service only from the agent with the lowest reported cost.
On the other hand, when the marginal costs depends on the exerted effort, the optimal mechanism
is in the form of crowd-sourcing, where the principal recruits multiple agents to complete the task.
• Numerical results: Simulation in Section 5 show that COPE improves both the principal’s
profit and the network profit, comparing to those mechanisms that assume all agents have equal
capabilities and incentivize agents exert the same amount of effort. Moreover, the performance gap
between COPE and the centralized benchmark solution is less than 3% under the quadratic cost
function and 10% under the linear cost function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature in Section 2, we
describe the system model in Section 3, and design the incentive mechanism in Section 4. In Section
5, we provide the simulations results. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Related Work
Mechanism design for truthful elicitation of agents’ opinions is an extensively studied problem, most
recently investigated are in the context of crowdsourcing (see, e.g., Cavallo and Jain (2015), Miller
et al. (2005), Prelec (2004), Shah et al. (2015), Shah and Zhou (2015)). In contrast to our work, this
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line of literature does not consider the prediction aspect, and only focuses on the elicitation problem
alone. Mechanism design for truthful elicitation of agents’ opinions is also studied in the context
of prediction markets (see, e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), Conitzer (2009)). These results,
however, study the scenario where the agents take the responsibility of aggregating information. Our
paper concerns a different setting and objective, in which the principal is in charge of information
gathering and making the final prediction. Hence, the mechanism we design should not only elicit
the agents’ information but also incentivize agents to exert appropriate effort.
The scenario becomes quite different when prediction must be done by taking incentives into
account, and calls for the design of new procedures catering to both aspects. The recent studies (see,
e.g., Fang et al. (2007), Ioannidis and Loiseau (2013), Frongillo et al. (2015), Cai et al. (2015),
Abernethy et al. (2015)) address problems in this space. However, the models assumed in these
works are different, and generally more restrictive than the models considered in our paper in many
respects. In particular, Fang et al. (2007) propose a betting mechanism for eliciting the observation
and the quality of each agent, under the assumption that the agents are homogeneous with the
same cost type. In contrast, we consider the more general and realistic setting where agents can
have different types. Ioannidis and Loiseau (2013) formulate the noise addition as a non-cooperative
game and prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Frongillo et al. (2015) study
how a principal can make predictions by eliciting the agents’ confidences, again without considering
the costs that may be incurred by the agents. Abernethy et al. (2015) consider a model where the
agents cannot fabricate their observation, but may lie about their costs, and design a mechanism
to ensure that agents truthfully report their costs. In contrast, we assume a more general scenario
where the agents can be strategic in choosing and reporting their respective observations. Cai et al.
(2015) propose a monetary mechanism to collect data and to perform an estimation of a function at
one random point. However, they assume that the agent always reports truthfully once he makes an
observation. In contrast, our work considers strategic agents and proposes an optimal mechanism
to ensure truth-telling by the agents.
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Figure 1 Sequence of interactions between the principal and the agents.
3. Problem Setting
We begin with a formal description of the problem formulation. Through this description, we will
set up notations to capture the behavior of the agents, the objective of the principal, the prediction
problem, and the mechanism-design problem.
3.1. System Model
We consider a setting where the principal wishes to make a parametric prediction, that is, to form
an informed estimate about a parameter x∗ ∈ X ⊆ R. Predicting the winner of an election and
predicting box office results for movies are two motivating examples. We assume that x∗ has a
prior distribution that is publicly known, for instance, from the results of an earlier election. We
assume that the principal will come to know the precise value of x∗ sometime in the future, for
instance, upon completion of the election. In order to make a prediction, the principal queries a
set A= {1, . . . ,N} of N agents to report their observations.
Figure 1 pictorially depicts the interaction between agents and the principal, including the agents’
reporting strategy and the principal’s prediction and payment decision. Before we explain each
individual components of the figure, we first introduce some notations used to characterize the
agents’ strategies and types in Figure 1.
Effort Level and Cost Type: When queried by the principal, an agent can put in some effort
to form an “observation” whose value is known only to that agent. We assume that the observation
of any agent is noisy, and the distribution of the observation yn comes from a parameterised family
of distributions φ(x∗, qn), where qn represents the effort exerted by agent n to make observation.
The higher value of qn, the more effort agent n exerts, and thus the better quality of agent n’s
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observation. An example that we focus on subsequently in the paper is additive Gaussian noise
(see, e.g., Fang et al. (2007), Cai et al. (2015)), i.e., yn ∼N (x∗, 1qn ), where yn follows from Gaussian
distribution with mean x∗ and variance 1/qn. Conditioned on x∗, the observations of the agents are
assumed to be mutually independent. As a shorthand, we let y = (yn,∀n ∈A) be the observation
vector and q= (qn,∀n∈A) be the effort vector. We further assume that agents do not collude with
each other, as each agent submits his observation to the crowdsourcing platform anonymous and
does not know the identities of others.
It is costly for each agent to exert a high level effort when making an observation, and this
cost not only depends on the effort chosen by the agent, but also is affected by the agent’s cost-
type parameter θn. The cost types of different agents are allowed to be different, capturing the
heterogeneity of the agents. A smaller value of θn implies a higher capability of agent n. Specifically,
we consider a publicly known cost function C :R+×R+→R+, and assume that the cost incurred
by an agent n∈A with the cost type θn when exerting an effort qn is C(qn, θn). We will study two
types of cost functions, i.e., the linear and quadratic cost functions in Section 4.1, and generalize
the results to general cost functions in Section 4.2.
The cost types {θn}n∈A are assumed to be randomly, independently and identically distributed
on support [θ, θ¯] for some 0≤ θ < θ¯ <∞. This distribution is assumed to be public knowledge. In
this paper we focus on the case where the distribution is uniform on the interval [θ, θ¯]. Uniform
assumption has been frequently used in the past incentive mechanism design (e.g., Fang et al.
(2007), Sheng and Liu (2013), Koutsopoulos (2013)), and our analysis also holds for the general
class of log-concave distributions such as exponential distribution and normal distribution.
Next, we will discuss each individual components of Figure 1 sequentially.
Reporting Observations and Making Payments: The principal employs monetary incen-
tives to ensure that agents make their observations and report them to the principal. In order to
incentivize agents to participate the prediction task, the payment to an agent must, at the least,
cover the cost incurred by that agent in putting effort to make the observation. However, since
each agent’s cost parameter is known only to that agent, the principal needs to ask each agent to
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report his own cost type (Figure 1a). The agents are strategic, and any agent n∈A may report a
cost type θˆn that is different from his true cost type θn. Let θˆ = (θˆn, n ∈A) be the reporting cost
type vector.
As we will see subsequently, incentivizing different agents to put different levels of effort depend-
ing on their respective cost types allows for a significantly better prediction performance. The
principal must incentivize these different effort levels, and the choice of these effort levels is
based on the agents’ reported cost types θˆ (Figure 1b). Let function Qp : [θ, θ¯]N → R+ denote
the effort that the principal requires an agent to exert. The function Qp depends on the cost
types reported by the agents: Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) represents the effort required from agent n ∈ A, where
θˆ−n = [θˆ1, . . . , θˆn−1, θˆn+1, . . . , θˆN ]T is the reported cost parameters of all agents except agent n.
Here (and elsewhere in the paper), we use the superscript “P” to represent the principal. We let
Qp(θˆ) = (Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n),∀n∈A) be the effort vector required by the principal.
Each agent n∈A is strategic and may exert an effort qn 6=Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) to suit his own interests.
When choosing the effort to exert, the agent may also exploit the fact that the principal cannot
directly observe the actual effort exerted. Upon exerting the chosen effort qn, the agent obtains an
observation yn (Figure 1c). The principal seeks to know the value of the observation yn, but the
agent may report a strategically chosen value yˆn 6= yn to the principal (Figure 1d) that suits the
agent’s own interests. We adopt the shorthand yˆ = (yˆn, n ∈ A) as the reporting vector. Based on
the information obtained, the principal must make a prediction for the value of x∗ (Figure 1e).
The principal makes payment to each agent once she observes the true value of x∗. Specifi-
cally, we define the payment function as R : R× R× [θ, θ¯]N×→ R+; the payment to agent n is
R(x∗, yˆn, θˆn, θˆ−n), which depends on the value of x∗, the agent n’s reported observation yˆn, and all
agents’ reported cost parameters θˆ.
As indicated above, the model considered is a one-shot model, i.e., once the agents simultaneously
report their observations, the principal determines the payments based on the agents’ reported cost
parameters and observations only, with no further adjustments on reported values or the payments.
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Payoff of Agent: Given the payment function announced by the principal, each agent n’s payoff
Ua :R× [θ, θ¯]×R+×R× [θ, θ¯]N →R is defined as the difference between the payment received from
the principal and the cost incurred in making the observation, and is given as
Ua(x∗, θˆn, qn, yˆn, θn, θˆ−n) =R(x
∗, yˆn, θˆn, θˆ−n)−C
(
qn, θn
)
, (1)
Here the superscript “A” indicates a term associated to the agents. Equation (1) shows that agent
n∈A’s payoff also depends on other agents’ reported cost parameters θˆ−n. When each agent n∈A
chooses his strategy, i.e., his cost reported value θˆn, exerted effort qn, and the reported observation
yˆn, to maximize his expected payoff. The expected payoff of the agent n is calculated as
E[Ua(x∗, θˆn, qn, yˆn, θn, θˆ−n)] =E[R(x∗, yˆn, θˆn, θˆ−n)]−C(qn, θn), (2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distributions of x∗ and all agents’ cost parameters
θ−n. Recall that each agent n only knows his own cost parameter θn, and only has distributional
information about other agents’ cost parameters.
Payoff of the Principal: Let function xˆ :R×R+→R characterize the prediction made by the
principal based on the agents’ reported observations yˆ and the effort assumed to be exerted by
the agents Qp(θˆ). Due to the inability of the principal to observe the agents’ exerted effort, the
principal makes prediction based on her own knowledge (i.e., the agents reported observation yˆ
and the effort Qp(θˆ) required from agents). Later in Section 4, we will show that the agents’ true
effort level are the same as that required by the principal by employing our proposed mechanism.
Let `p : R×R→ R+ be the loss function that characterizes the penalty term for mistakes in the
prediction. For instance, one could consider the squared loss `p(x∗, xˆ(yˆ,qp)) = (x∗ − xˆ(yˆ,qp))2 as
the penalty for the principal, where qpn = Q
p(θˆn, θˆ−n) and qp = (qpn,∀n ∈ A). We use qp as the
shorthand notation for Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n), in order to show that qpn, for any n∈A, is a decision variable
for the principal. In Section 4.2.1, we will show how the principal determines the desired effort
from the agents by taking the first order derivative of her Bayes risk with respect to qpn.
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Table 1 Notations
x∗ A parameter needs to be estimate
xˆ Prediction based by the principal
qn Effort exerted by agent n∈A
qpn Effort desired by the principal from agent n ∈ A, calculated by the
function Qp : [θ, θ¯]N →R+
yn True observation of agent n∈A
yˆn Reported observation of agent n∈A
θn True cost type of agent n∈A
θˆn Reported cost type of agent n∈A
C(qn, θn) Cost incurred by an agent n ∈A with the cost type θn when exerting
an effort qn
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) Effort desired by the principal from agent n ∈ A given all agents
reported cost type
Bp(qp) Bayes risk of the principal’s prediction
We measure the utility gained by the principal through the prediction in terms of the Bayes risk
incurred under this loss function. The reason that we use Bayes risk is that it yields a real number
(not a function of xˆ or yˆ) for each prediction, and the principal’s posterior expected prediction loss
is equivalent to the Bayes risk (see Robert (2007), Berger (2013)). If all agents report their true
observations (i.e., yˆ = y) and exert efforts as desired by the principal (i.e., q = qp =Qp(θˆ)), then
the Bayes risk Bp :R×R→R+ is (see Robert (2007), Berger (2013))
Bp(qp) = inf
xˆ
E[`p(x∗, xˆ(y,qp))], (3)
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and y. By assuming that the principal’s utility
with perfect prediction is zero, the Bayes risk chacterzies the penality for the principal’s mistakes
in the prediction, and the prinicial’s expected utility is just −Bp(qp). Correspondingly, the payoff
of the principal U p : R × RN × [θ, θ¯]N → R is then defined as the difference between her utility
obtained from prediction and the monetary payments to all agents:
U p(x∗,qp,y, θˆ) =−Bp(qp)−
∑
n∈A
R(x∗, yn, θˆn, θˆ−n). (4)
Here, we assumed without loss of generality that the monetary payment and the prediction loss is
normalized to be on the same scale.
For clarity, we list the key notations in Table 1.
3.2. Design Objective
Before explaining the design objective, we begin by defining two standard game-theoretic terms
that are required for subsequent discussions.
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Definition 1. (BIC: Bayesian Incentive Compatibility) A mechanism satisfies the Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility (BIC) if for every agent n∈A, his expected payoff satisfies (see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991), Myerson (1979))
E
[
Ua(x∗, θn,Q
p(θn,θ−n), yn, θn,θ−n)
]≥E[Ua(x∗, θˆn, qn, yˆn, θn,θ−n)],
∀(θˆn, qn, yˆn) 6=(θn,Qp(θn,θ−n), yn), (5)
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and all other agents cost parameters θ−n.
BIC means that for any agent n, reporting the true cost parameter, exerting the effort requested
by the principal, and reporting true observation will maximize his expected payoff, given common
knowledge about the distribution on agents cost parameters and when other agents are truthfully
report their cost parameters.
Definition 2. (BIR: Bayesian Individual Rationality) A mechanism satisfies the Bayesian incen-
tive rationality (BIR), if the expected payoff of every agent n ∈ A is non-negative, given that he
reports truthfully, exerts effort as the principal desires, and assumes that all other agents report
their cost parameters truthfully, that is (see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Myerson (1979)),
E
[
Ua(x∗, θn,Q
p(θn,θ−n), yn, θn,θ−n)
]≥ 0, ∀n∈A, (6)
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and all other agents’ cost parameters θ−n.
Assuming (without loss of generality) that the payoff of an agent not participating in this process
equals zero, BIR means that an agent will participate only if his expected payoff is at least as much
as that of a non-participating agent.
Based on the revelation principal (see Myerson (1979)), the problem of finding a mechanism that
maximizes the principal’s expected payoff can be restricted to the set of mechanisms where agents
are willing to reveal their private information to the principal. Moreover, the principal cannot force
agents to accept the task. Hence, the problem that we want to solve is formalized as follows. The
goal is to design a mechanism, say M, that maximizes the principal’s expected while ensuring
truthful reports from the agents:
sup
M
E
[
U p(x∗,y,θ)
]
subject to: BIC and BIR in (5) and (6),
(7)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗, y and θ, and the BIR condition makes sure that
the agents are willing to participate in the game. In words, the goal is to design a mechanism such
that: (i) the principal’s payoff is maximized in expectation; (ii) the principal can elicit truthful
information from all agents; and (iii) the principal can incentivise suitable effort from the agents
based on their respective cost parameters.
4. The COPE Mechanism
In this section, we present our mechanism “COPE” (COst and Prediction Elicitation) that provides
an optimal solution to the problem (7) of parametric prediction from parametric agents. We will
first consider two specific settings in order to illustrate the key ideas behind COPE, and to obtain
some concrete engineering insights. We will then proceed to present COPE in full generality.
4.1. Two Example Settings
We consider the following specific setting in this section. We consider the Gaussian case, where
we assume the prior x∗ ∼N (µ0, σ20), and the observation of every agent n follows the distribution
yn ∼N (x∗, 1qn ), independent of all other events. The values of µ0 and σ0 are assumed to be public
knowledge. We assume θn ∼Uniform[θ, θ¯], independent for every n ∈A. We consider the squared
`2-loss to measure the prediction error, namely, `
p(x∗, xˆ) = (x∗− xˆ)2. In what follows, we consider
two cost functions: (i) the linear cost function C(q, θ) = qθ, and (ii) the quadratic cost function
C(q, θ) = 1
2
θq2.
4.1.1. Linear Cost Function C(q, θ) = qθ We first consider the linear cost function C(q, θ) =
qθ and discuss the corresponding COPE mechanism. Algorithm 1 presents the higher-level structure
of the mechanism which corresponds to the steps in Figure 1. The optimality of the mechanism
crucially relies on the careful construction of specific functions referred to in the algorithm, and
these constructions are described below.
Recall that the function Qp : [θ, θ¯]× [θ, θ¯]N−1→R+ specifies the effort that the principal requires
an agent to exert, based on the cost parameters reported by all agents. In Theorem 1 subsequently,
we show that when the cost function is linear, the principal requires only one agent to exert effort.
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Algorithm 1 COPE
Step 1: The principal announces a payment function R.
Step 2: Every agent n∈A independently reports a cost type θˆn ∈ [θ, θ¯] to the principal.
Step 3: The principal sends each agent n ∈ A a contract, which specifies the effort level Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) along
with values of functions pi(θˆn, θˆ−n), K(θˆn, θˆ−n), and S(θˆn, θˆ−n) that comprise the function R.
Step 4: Each agent n∈A exerts effort qn and makes an observation yn.
Step 5: Each agent n∈A reports an estimate yˆn.
Step 6: The principal makes prediction xˆ.
Step 7: The true value x∗ is realized.
Step 8: The principal makes the payment R(x∗, yˆn, θˆn, θˆ−n) to every agent n∈A.
If there are multiple agents achieving the same minimum value of θˆn, the principal would randomly
choose one agent to exert effort. This property is reflected in the following choice of function Qp:
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) =
{
max{(2θˆn− θ)− 12 −σ−20 ,0} if n= arg minm∈A θˆm
0 otherwise.
(8)
The function Qp is designed to strike an optimal balance between the prediction error and the
monetary expenditure, accommodating the fact that the agents are heterogeneous. We define n0 =
argminm∈Aθˆm, that is, n0 is the agent with the lowest reported cost parameter.
We now characterize the function R that governs the payment made by the principal to the
agents. The payments to all agents other than agent n0 are zero, since these agents are not involved
in the observation and prediction procedure. The payment made to agent n0 is
R(x∗, yˆn0 , θˆn0 , θˆ−n0) = pi(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0)− (x∗− yˆn0)2 ·K(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0) +S(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0), (9)
where
pi(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0) = pi(θˆn0) = θˆn0(2θˆn0 − θ)−
1
2 − θ¯σ−20 + 2[(2θ¯− θ)
1
2 − (2θˆn− θ) 12 ],
K(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0) =K(θˆn0) = θˆn0(2θˆn0 − θ)−1, and S(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0) = S(θˆn0) = θˆn0(2θˆn0 − θ)−
1
2 . (10)
Let us explain the main ideas behind the above choices. The detailed proof can be found in
Appendix. First, The term (x∗− yˆn0)2 in (9) ensures that the agent reports his observation truth-
fully. This is because no other terms in (9) depend on yˆn0 , and the value of calculated by K(θˆn0)
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is always positive. Hence, when the agent chooses the reporting observation strategy to maximize
his expected payoff, he focuses on minimizing the term Ex∗ [(x∗ − yˆn0)2] whose value is minimum
only when the agent reports his truthful observation, i.e., yˆn0 = yn0 . Second, we can verify that the
expected payoff of the agent is maximized only when the agent truthfully reports his cost param-
eter, given the agent reports his true observation. Third, the choices of functions K and S ensure
that the agent exerts an effort as desired by the principal. As the term (x∗− yˆn0)2 makes the agent
reports his true observation, we can verify that the expected payoff of the agent is maximized only
when the agent chooses qn0 =Q
p(θn0 ,θ−n0). Finally, the function pi is designed to ensure that the
principal’s expected payoff defined in (4) is maximized while ensuring BIC and BIR condition is
satisfied. As we shown that the term (x∗− yˆn0)2 and the choices of functions K and S guarantee
the truthful behavior of the agent, i.e., yˆn0 = yˆn and qn0 =Q
p(θn0 ,θ−n0), the expected value of R
simply equals to the value of the function pi. In such case, we can focus on deriving the function of
pi to maximize the expected payoff the principal.
Then we characterize the prediction decision made by the principal. After collecting all agents
reported observations, the principal makes the prediction xˆ based on the following equation:
xˆ(yˆn0 , q
p
n0
) =
µ0 · 1/σ20 + qpn0 · g(yˆn0)
1/σ20 + q
p
n0
, (11)
where qpn0 =Q
p(θˆn0 , θˆ−n0), and function g :R→R is defined as g(yˆn0) = yˆn0 + (yˆn0−µ0)(qpn0 ·σ20) .
Here, the predictor xˆ employed by the principal is the standard Bayes estimator operating on
the agents’ responses and this predictor does not affect the payoff of the agents.
We prove that the proposed COPE mechanism is optimal.
Theorem 1. Under the linear cost function C(q, θ) = qθ, COPE satisfies the BIC and BIR con-
dition defined in (5) and (6) and maximizes the principal’s expected payoff defined in (7).
We provide the detailed proof in Appendix A. An important consequence of the theorem is that
the optimal mechanism in the case of linear costs awards the task to the single agent with the
lowest bid. This corresponds to what we call a “crowd-tender” system where all agents submit their
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cost parameters, and the lowest bidder is awarded the task. We will discuss the intuition behind
such a result in more details in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.2. Quadratic Cost Function C(q, θ) = 1
2
θq2 We now consider a quadratic cost function
C(q, θ) = 1
2
θq2 and present COPE for this setting. The higher level structure of COPE is again
given by Algorithm 1, and the specific functions referred to in the algorithm is provided below.
Under COPE, the function Qp : [θ, θ¯]× [θ, θ¯]N−1→R+ that governs the effort that the principal
requires an agent to exert is given as
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) = (2θˆn− θ)−1(W (θˆ))−2, (12)
where W is the solution of the equation [W (θ)]3− 1
σ20
[W (θ)]2 =
∑
m∈A
1
2θm−θ . An explicit (although
cumbersome) solution of W is provided in (103) of Appendix B.
As in the case of linear costs, the function Qp is designed to optimally harness the heterogenity
of the agents in order to minimize the prediction error with a small enough payment. Note that in
contrast to the linear case (8), here the principal requires every agent to exert a positive effort.
We define the function R that governs the payment to any agent n as
R(x∗, yˆn, θˆn, θˆ−n) = pi(θˆn, θˆ−n)− (x∗− yˆn)2 ·K(θˆn, θˆ−n) +S(θˆn, θˆ−n), (13)
where
pi(θˆn, θˆ−n) =
1
2
(
θˆn ·
[
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n)
]2
+
∫ θ¯
θˆn
[
Qp(z, θˆ−n)
]2
dz
)
,
K(θˆn, θˆ−n) =
[
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
]2
θˆn ·Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n),
S(θˆn, θˆ−n) =
[
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
]
θˆn ·Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n). (14)
These functions have a form similar to those in the case of linear costs (9), except that these
functions depend on the reported cost parameters of all N agents, whereas the corresponding
functions in the linear cost setting depended only on the reported cost parameter of one agent. The
remaining higher level intuition behind this construction is similar to that behind the linear-cost
case described in the previous section.
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The principal uses the Bayes estimate as her predictor:
xˆ(yˆ,qp) =
(1−N)µ0/σ20 +
∑
n∈A (1/σ
2
0 + q
p
n) · yˆn
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
, (15)
where qpn =Q
p(θˆn, θˆ−n).
The following theorem establishes the optimality guarantee of COPE under quadratic costs.
Theorem 2. Under the quadratic cost function C(q, θ) = 1
2
θq2, COPE satisfies the BIC and BIR
condition defined in (5) and (6) and maximizes the principal’s expected payoff defined in (7).
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix B. As COPE under the quadratic cost function
requires all agents to exert certain effort and to report their observation, this corresponds to a
“crowd-sourcing” system.
4.1.3. Engineering Takeaways Our results show that interestingly, it is optimal for the
principal to call for a crowd-tender when the cost function is linear, while it is optimal to design a
crowd-sourcing mechanism when the cost function is quadratic. Informally, the cost function acts
as a regularizer on the choice of effort levels qp, and the dichotomy of these two cost functions
is related to the sparsity inducing properties of the `1-regularizer, and the lack thereof of the
(squared) `2-regularizer.
4.2. General Setting
In this section, we will present COPE under more general forms of the cost function, the noise
distribution, the prior distribution, and the prediction loss function. Under these general conditions,
the structure of the mechanism remains identical to Algorithm 1. We will show that COPE is
optimal and feasible under certain regularity conditions.
4.2.1. Assumptions
Cost Function We first define the general cost function of the agent n ∈ A. Specifically, for
agent n∈A, his cost function C :R+×R+→R+ is C(qn, θn) =
∫ qn
0
c(z, θn)dz, where c(z, θn) is the
the marginal cost function. We assume that the marginal cost function c :R+×R+→R+ satisfies:
∂c(q, θ)
∂q
> 0,
∂c(q, θ)
∂θ
> 0,
∂2c(q, θ)
∂θ2
> 0, ∂
2c(q, θ)
∂q∂θ
> 0. (16)
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where the first inequality shows a nondecreasing marginal cost in agent’s effort level, the second
and third inequalities show that the marginal cost is monotonically increasing and convex in the
cost parameter θn, the last inequality implies that the marginal cost with respect to cost parameter
θn is increasing in effort q. These assumptions are widely used to model the cost function (see, e.g.,
Che (1993), Chen et al. (2008) and references therein).
The cost types {θn}n∈A are assumed to be randomly, independently and identically distributed
with a cumulative distribution function F : [θ, θ¯]→R+ and probability density function f : [θ, θ¯]→
R+. The functions F and f are public knowledge to all agents. We also assume that the c.d.f.
function F is continuous, differentiable, and log concave in [θ, θ¯]. This is a regularity condition often
assumed in auction contexts (see, e.g., Myerson (1981)). This assumption is satisfied by a wide
range of distributions, such as the uniform, gamma, and beta distributions. See Rosling (2002) for
an extensive discussion on log concave probability distributions.
Observation and Loss Function We assume that the distribution of the observation yn of any
agent n∈A comes from a parameterized family of distributions φ(x∗, qn), where qn represents the
effort exerted by agent n to make observation. A typical parameterized distribution, for example,
is the Gaussian distribution with mean x∗ and variance 1/qn.
Let xˆ : RN × RN+ → RN be the prediction function that characterizes the prediction made by
the principal, and `p : R× R→ R+ be the loss function that characterizes the penalty term for
mistakes in the principal’s prediction. A typical loss function, for example, is the squared loss
`p(x∗, xˆ(y,qp)) = [x∗ − xˆ(y,qp)]2, where qpn = Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) and qp = (qpn,∀n ∈ A). We measure the
utility gained by the principal through the prediction in terms of the Bayes risk. Here, the Bayes
risk is calculated under the loss function `p. Specifically, if all agents report their true observations
(i.e., yˆ= y) and exert efforts as desired by the principal (i.e., q= qp =Qp(θˆ)), then the Bayes risk
Bp :R×R→R+ is
Bp(qp) = inf
xˆ
E[`p(x∗, xˆ(y,qp))], (17)
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and y. We assume that such a Bayes estimator
minimizing the Bayes risk exists, and that the Bayes risk is finite.1
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We will also assume the existence of a function `a :R×R→R+ using which the principal may
measure the accuracy of an agent’s report. Specifically, we assume that if yn is generated according
to agent n’s observation distribution, then we assume that `a satisfies
yn ∈ arg inf
y
†
n
E[`a(x∗, y†n(yn))], (18)
where function y†n : R→ R characterizes the reporting strategy of the agent n ∈ A given his true
observation is yn, the infimum is over all measurable functions of the observation yn, and the
assumption says that the identity function is a minimizer of the expected value of `a when its first
argument is x∗. For instance, we considered `a(x∗, yˆn) = (x∗ − yˆn)2 earlier in the two motivating
examples involving the Gaussian distribution.
We let Ba :R×R→R+ denote the associated Bayes risk:
Ba(qn) = inf
yn
E[`a(x∗, yn)], (19)
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and yn, and the distribution of yn depends on the
agent’s exerted effort qn. The Bayes risk of the principal, i.e., B
p(qp), characterizes the principle’s
expected payoff loss due to the difference between the true value x∗ and her own prediction xˆ;
while the Bayes risk of the agent, i.e., Ba(qn), characterizes the agent n∈A’s expected payoff loss
due to the difference between the true value xˆ and his reporting prediction yˆn.
We assume that the Bayes risk of the principal and the agent satisfy the following monotonicity
conditions:
∂Bp(qp)
∂qpn
6 0, dB
a(qn)
dqn
6 0, ∂
2Bp(qp)
∂qpn
2 > 0,
d2Ba(qn)
dqn2
> 0, ∂
2Bp(qp)
∂qpn∂q
p
m
> 0, ∀m 6= n. (20)
In Section 4.1, we can verify that under the Gaussian distribution, the Bayes risk of the principal
is Bp(qp) = 1
1/σ20+
∑
n∈A qpn
and the Bayes risk of the agent is Ba(qn) =
1
1/σ20+qn
, both satisfy (20).
We assume that the principal has designed a mechanism that can control the agents’ exerted
effort and elicit agents to report their observation truthfully. Hence, from the principal’s point of
view, qpn, for any n∈A is a decision variable for the principal, and we can take the derivative of the
principal’s Bayes risk with respect to qpn in (20). However, in reality, the agents would strategically
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choose their exerted effort. Hence, we need to design a mechanism that involves a carefully designed
function Qp, so that the agents would put the effort as the principal expected and truthfully report
their observations.
Given these preliminaries, we now present our mechanism for this setting.
4.2.2. Mechanism Our proposed mechanism COPE for the general setting also follows Algo-
rithm 1, with the specific functions detailed below.
The function Qp : [θ, θ¯]× [θ, θ¯]N−1→ R+ that governs the effort that the principal requires an
agent to exert is given as the solution of the equation
maxQp Eθ
[
−Bp(Qp(θˆ))−∑
n∈A
C
(
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n), θn
)−∑
n∈A
∂C
(
Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n), θn
)
∂θn
· F (θn)
f(θn)
]
s.t. Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) is nonincreasing in θˆn,∀n∈A. (21)
We define the function R(·) that governs the payment to any agent n as
R(x∗, yˆn, θˆn, θˆ−n) = pi(θˆn, θˆ−n)− `a(x∗, yˆn) ·K(θˆn, θˆ−n) +S(θˆn, θˆ−n), (22)
where
pi(θˆn, θˆ−n) =C
(
Qp(θn,θ−n), θn
)
+
∫ θ¯
θn
∂C(Qp(z,θ−n), η)
∂η
dz, (23)
K(θˆn, θˆ−n) = −c(Q
p(θˆn, θˆ−n), θˆn)
dBa(qn)/dqn
∣∣∣∣∣
qn=Qp(θˆn,θˆ−n)
, (24)
S(θˆn, θˆ−n) = −c(Q
p(θˆn, θˆ−n), θˆn) ·Ba(qn)
dBa(qn)/dqn
∣∣∣∣∣
qn=Qp(θˆn,θˆ−n)
, (25)
The principal uses the Bayes estimate as her predictor: xˆ(yˆ,qp) = arg inf xˆE
[
`p
(
x∗, xˆ(yˆ,qp)
)]
.
The detailed form of the principal’s estimation depends on the distribution of each agent’s obser-
vation φ(x∗, qn) defined in Section 3.1 and the loss function `p. With the Gaussian distribution and
quadratic loss function adopted in Section 4, the principal’s predictor is calculated as xˆ(yˆ,qp) =
(1−|Ap|)µ0/σ20+
∑
n∈Ap (1/σ
2
0+q
p
n)·yˆn
1/σ20+
∑
n∈Ap qpn
, where qpn =Q
p(θˆn, θˆ−n) is the decision variable of the principal, Ap
is the set of agents recruited by the principal to report their estimation, and |Ap| is the number of
agents in the set Ap.
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4.2.3. Guarantees The following theorem establishes the optimality guarantees of COPE.
Theorem 3. COPE satisfies the BIC and BIR condition defined in (5) and (6) and maximizes
the principal’s expected payoff defined in (7) if
∂c
(
Qp(θn,θ−n), θn
)
∂θn
≤ 0, (26)
where function c characterizes the agent’s magical cost and is defined in (16).
Condition (26) implies that the marginal cost of the agent should decrease with the agent’s
cost type, so that COPE can induce the truthful behavior of the agents. We note that condition
(26) is satisfied under the Gaussian case when θ follows from uniform distribution, as discussed in
Appendix A and B.
5. Simulations
We conduct numerical studies to evaluate the performance of COPE. In particular, we investigate
the amount of gain that can be achieved by (optimally) exploiting the heterogeneity of the agents.
We first consider an integrated system, where the principal and all agents act as an integrated
decision maker to maximize their aggregate profit (called network profit). We denote the network
profit achieved under the integrated system as the centralized benchmark.2 Then we describe
the details of the homogeneous benchmark mechanism under both the linear and quadratic cost
function. Finally we compare the performance of COPE to the homogeneous benchmark in terms
of principal’s expected payoff, expected prediction error and total payment made by the principal
to the agents.
5.1. Centralized Mechanism
In the integrated system, the integrated player (the principal and all agents) knows the precise
value of θ (i.e., all agents’ cost types). Moreover, all participated agents would exert the effort that
maximizes the network profit. Specifically, the expected network profit is defined as the difference
between her utility obtained from prediction and the cost of all agents:
Unp(q,θ) =−Bp(q)−
∑
n∈A
C
(
qn, θn
)
, (27)
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where the utility gained through the prediction is measured in terms of the Bayes risk given in
(17). Let function qo :R+× [θ, θ¯]→R+ be the solution that maximizes the network profit defined
in (27). By focusing on the case x∗ ∼ N (µ0, σ20), we have the optimal solution under linear cost
function as:
qon =
{
max{1/√θn− 1/σ20,0}, if n= arg minm∈A θm,
0, otherwise.
(28)
The optimal solution under quadratic cost function is
qon =
1
θn
· 1[
W o(θ)
]2 , (29)
where the function W o : [θ, θ¯]N →R+ is the solution of the below equation:
[
W o(θ)
]3− 1
σ20
· [W o(θ)]2−∑
m∈A
1
θm
= 0. (30)
In the integrated system, the integrated player makes the prediction as
xˆ=
µ0/σ
2
0 +
∑
n∈A y
o
n · qon
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
o
n
, (31)
where yon is agent n∈A’s true observation.
5.2. Homogenous Mechanism
The homogenous mechanism assumes all agents to be identical (although in practice they are not),
and hence does not elicit the cost parameters of individual agents. In the absence of this knowledge,
the principal operates under the belief that every agent’s cost parameter equals θ† ∈ [θ, θ¯]. The
principal thus chooses payment function Rhom := α(θ
†) − β(θ†) · (x∗ − yˆn)2, where the function
α : [θ, θ¯]→ R+ and the function β : [θ, θ¯]→ R+ are chosen to incentivize every agent n to exert
optimal effort and report observations truthfully in a manner that maximizes the principal’s payoff.
We focus on the case where x∗ ∼N (µ0, σ20). Let function q† :R+× [θ, θ¯]→R+ be the effort that
the principal requires every agent to exert, based on the principal’s belief that every agent’s cost
parameter equals to θ†. Then the principal makes the prediction as
xˆ=
µ0/σ
2
0 + q
†∑
n∈A g(yˆn)
1/σ20 +N · q†
, (32)
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where yˆn is the agent n’s reported observation, and the function g :R→R is defined as
g(yˆn) = yˆn +
yˆn−µ0
q† ·σ20
. (33)
Linear Cost Function: Under the linear cost function, the choices of functions q†, α, and β
are
q†(N,θ†) =
1
N
( 1√
θ†
− 1
σ20
)
,
α(θ†) =
(
1/σ20 + q
†) · θ†q†+ θ†q†, β(θ†) = (1/σ20 + q†)2 · θ†
The principal chooses the function α(·) to make sure that the agent n with the cost type θ†
is willing to participate the prediction task, and chooses the function β(·) to make sure that the
agent n exerts the effort qn = q
†(N,θ†) as the principal desires.
Recall that the actual cost parameter of the agent n ∈ A is θn. Hence, the agent n will exert
effort qn =
√
β(θ†)/θn−1/σ20 and report yˆn = µ0/σ
2
0+yn·qn
1/σ20+qn
to maximize his expected payoff. Besides,
if the expected payoff of the agent n is negative, he will not participate this prediction task.
Also recall that the principal knows the prior information of x∗ ∼N (µ0, σ20). Hence, the principal
can always achieve a payoff of −1/σ20 by not making any payments, and simply choosing the prior
mean has her prediction. Hence, the principal does not pay anything and simply sets xˆ= µ0 if her
expected payoff is smaller than −1/σ20.
Quadratic Cost Function: Under the quadratic cost function, q† is the solution of the following
equation:
1(
1/σ20 +N · q†
)2 − θ† · q† = 0
The functions α(·) and β(·) are :
α(θ†) =
(
1/σ20 + q
†) · θ†q†+ 1
2
θ†
[
q†
]2
, β(θ†) =
(
1/σ20 + q
†)2 · θ†q†.
Recall that the actually cost parameter of the agent n ∈A is θn. Hence, the agent n will exert
effort qn to maximize his own expected payoff, where qn is the solution of
β(
1/σ20 + qn
)2 − θnqn = 0.
Parametric Prediction from Parametric Agents
23
Besides, if the expected payoff of the agent n is negative, he will not participate this prediction
task. Also, the principal does not pay anything and simply sets xˆ = µ0 if her expected payoff is
smaller than −1/σ20.
5.3. Numerical Results
In the simulations, we draw x∗ ∼N (0,1), and set θ = 0 and θ¯ = 1. We vary the number of agents
from N = 3 to N = 19. Each point in the plots is an average across 50000 trials. Without loss of
generality, we have normalized the principal’s payoff (see (4)) so that it equals zero in the ideal
(unachievable) case of zero prediction error and a zero payment. Note that the principal can always
achieve a payoff of −1 by not making any payments, and simply choosing the prior mean has her
prediction.
Figure 2 depicts the principal’s expected payoff achieved under COPE and under the homoge-
neous mechanism for different values of θ† when the cost function is linear and quadratic, respec-
tively. We use the red line with circle markers to denote COPE, the blue dash line with square
markers to denote homogeneous mechanism with θ† = 0.2, the dark dash line with diamond mark-
ers to denote homogeneous mechanism with θ† = 0.5, and the magenta line with right-pointing
triangle markers to denote homogeneous mechanism with θ† = 0.8.
Figure 2 shows that COPE can improve the principal’s payoff by exploring the heterogeneity of
users. The improvement is at least 10% under the linear cost function and 5% under the quadratic
cost function.
By comparing Figure 2a to Figure 2b, we can see that the value of the belief of principal (i.e.,
θ†) under the homogeneous mechanism will affect the final result. Under the linear cost function, a
lower value of θ† results in a better performance in terms of the principal’s payoff. However, under
the quadratic cost function, a higher value of θ† results in a better performance. The reasons are
as follows.
Under the homogeneous mechanism, the value of θ† will determine the number and types of
agents joining the task. Having a higher value of θ† would incentivize more agents to participate.
Parametric Prediction from Parametric Agents
24
Number of agents
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
ay
of
f o
f t
he
 p
rin
cip
al
-2
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
COPE
Homogeneous 3y = 0:2
Homogeneous 3y = 0:5
Homogeneous 3y = 0:8
(a) Linear cost function
Number of agents
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
ay
of
f o
f t
he
 p
rin
cip
al
-2
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0
COPE
Homogeneous 3y = 0:2
Homogeneous 3y = 0:5
Homogeneous 3y = 0:8
(b) Quadratic cost function
Figure 2 The principal’s expected payoff under COPE and the homogeneous mechanism.
This is because, for an agent n∈A whose cost parameter θn < θ†, he can put less effort to achieve
the same performance as the agent with cost parameter θ† can.
Under the linear cost function, similar as COPE, finding the most capable one would be optimal
for the principal, as the marginal cost is nonnegative even the agent does not put any effort. Hence,
having a lower value of θ† would eliminate more agents, and have a higher chance to find the agent
with θn ≤ θ†.
On the contrary, under the quadratic cost function, it would be optimal to recruit as many agents
as possible to improve the prediction accuracy. The benefit brought by the accuracy improvement
would be higher than the additional payment to agents. Hence, having a higher value of θ† would
help the principal recruit more agents.
Figure 3 depicts the network profit achieved under COPE and under the homogeneous mechanism
for different values of θ† when the cost function is linear and quadratic, respectively. We use the
dash brown line to denote the benchmark solution where the principal and all agents acted as an
integrated player.
From Figure 3, we have the following observations.
• COPE can achieve a network profit close to the integrated benchmark solution, e.g., the gap
is less than 10% under the linear cost function and 3% under the quadratic cost function.
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Figure 3 The network profit under COPE and the homogeneousmechanism.
• Network profit achieved under COPE increases with the number of agents. This is because
the increasing number of agents allows the principal to have a higher chance to incentivize agents
with high capability to improve the prediction accuracy. This is true under both costs, even though
only one agent will be recruited under the linear cost.
• COPE leads to a much higher network profit, compared to the homogeneous mechanism. The
reason is that COPE explores the heterogeneity of agents by eliciting their cost type information.
Recall that the principal makes the prediction based on (32) in the homogeneous mechanism.
As the actually effort exerted by the agents are different from that desired by the principal (i.e.,
qn 6= q†), the prediction made by the principal is inaccurate. On the contrary, COPE elicits the
cost types of agents as well as incentivizes each agent to exert the appropriate level of effort, which
results in a better performance than the homogeneous mechanism. Due to the joint effect of the
number of agents and the value of θ†, the performance of homogeneous mechanism is close to that
of COPE (e.g., N < 4 under the linear cost function and N < 6 under the quadratic cost function)
in terms of expected network profit. However, it is difficult to determine the proper choice of θ† in
terms of the number of agents. Finding the optimal value of θ† given the number of agents will be
an interesting future work.
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6. Conclusions
We study the parametric prediction market under information asymmetry. To elicit the truthful
information of participating agents and exploit the heterogeneity in the agents, we propose mech-
anism COPE, which ensures agents to exert effort desired by the principal and report their true
observation. Our analysis indicate that, under the Gaussian estimation noise scenario, when the
costs incurred by the agents are linear in the amount of exerted effort, the principal should require
service from only one agent with the lowest reported cost. On the other hand, when the costs are
quadratic in the exerted effort, it is optimal for the principal to recruit multiple agents to complete
the task. We also present the general form of COPE that is optimal for a wide variety of settings
(e.g., general cost function and the noise distribution).
In this work, we have focused on the parametric setting, where the principal recruits agents to
estimate a parameter (e.g., the winner of a election) that the realized value can be observed in
the future. As in some cases, such as rating the quality of a book, the true outcome cannot be
easily observed or verified. In the future, we will consider how to incentivize agents’ behaviour
when collecting subjective data. Moreover, in order to give theoretical insights into the problem
of estimation from strategic agents, we use one parameter, i.e., the cost type θ to characterize
the heterogeneity of the agents in terms of their cost. Relaxing the parametric assumption (e.g.,
characterizing agents’ types with random functions) and designing mechanisms with theoretical
guarantees is extremely challenging. In practice, heuristics (e.g., Brousseau and Glachant (2002),
Chiappori and Salanie´ (1997)) are employed to circumvent the parametric assumption when using
these mechanisms. In the future, we would consider how to relax such parametric assumption.
Appendix. Full Proofs
A. Proof of Theorem 1: Linear Costs
The proof will proceed in four steps. The first three steps show that our mechanism incentivizes the
agents to be truthful, and the fourth step proves optimality of our mechanism. First, we show that
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irrespective of what an agent reports as his cost parameter, and irrespective of the effort he exerts,
the agent is always incentivized to report his true observation. We follow this up and show that
irrespective of the effort that an agent exerts, he is always incentivized to report his cost parameter
correctly. The third step completes the proof of truthfulness, showing that under truthful reporting
of the cost parameter and the observation, in our mechanism, an agent is always incentivized to
exert precisely the effort as desired by the principal. Finally, we show that among all mechanisms
that ensure truthful reports, our mechanism maximizes the principal’s expected utility.
We assume that the random variables {θn}n∈A are independently and identically distributed on
support [θ, θ¯], with a cumulative distribution function F : [θ, θ¯]→ R+ and a probability density
function f : [θ, θ¯]→ R+. We further assume that the c.d.f. function F is continues, differentiable,
and log concave in [θ, θ¯]. This assumption is satisfied by a wide range of distributions, such as
uniform, gamma, and beta distributions.
Step 1. Truthful reporting of observation under COPE
We will analyze the strategies of the agent who is recruited by the principal and the agents who
are not recruited by the principal, respectively.
We first study the observation reporting strategy of the agent n0 who is recruited and rewarded
by the principal, where n0 = argminm∈Aθˆm.
We will show that the agent n0 will choose
yˆn0 =
µ0 · 1/σ20 + yn0 · qn0
1/σ20 + qn0
(34)
to maximize his expected payoff given his exerting effort qn0 and own observation yn0 .
As shown in (9), pi(θˆn0), K(θˆn0) and S(θˆn0) are independent of yˆn0 . Moreover, the value of
calculated by K(θˆn0) is always positive. Hence, when the agent n0 makes reporting observation
strategy to maximize his expected payoff, i.e.,
yˆn0 ∈ argmaxE
[
pi(θˆn0)−K(θˆn0) · (x∗− yˆn0)2 +S(θˆn0)
]−C(qn0 , θn0),
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and cost parameters θ−n0 =
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[θ1, . . . , θn0−1, θn0+1, . . . , θN ]
T except agent n0, it is equivalent for the agent n0 to choose reporting
strategy such that
yˆn0 ∈ argminEx∗ [(x∗− yˆn0)2]. (35)
Based on theory of Bayesian estimation (see Myerson (1979), Lehmann and Casella (1998)), only
when yˆn0 =
µ0·1/σ20+yn0 ·qn0
1/σ20+qn0
, the value of Ex∗ [(x∗− yˆn0)2] is minimized and the expected value is
Ex∗ [(x∗− yˆn0)2] =
1
1/σ20 + qn0
.
We then study the observation reporting strategy of other agents who are not recruited and
rewarded by the principal. For agent n∈A, n 6= n0, he will put zero effort as he does not receive any
reward from the principal. In this case, only when reporting his observation yˆn = µ0 can minimize
Ex∗ [(x∗− yˆn)2]. The expected value of Ex∗ [(x∗− yˆn)2] is
Ex∗ [(x∗− yˆn)2] = 1
1/σ20
, n∈A, n 6= n0.
Step 2. Truthful reporting of the cost parameter under COPE
We first show that the agent n0 will truthfully reveals his cost type. We first rewrite functions
pi, K, and S as follows.
pi(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) =θˆn0 ·Qp(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) +
∫ θ¯
θˆn0
Qp(z,θ−n0)dz,
K(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) =
[
Qp(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
]2 · θˆn0 ,
S(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) =
[
Qp(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
] · θˆn0 .
The expected payoff of the agent who has a cost type θn0 but reports θˆn0 is:
E{x∗,yn0 ,θ−n0}
[
Ua(x∗, θˆn0 , qn0 , yn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
=Eθ−n0
[
pi(θˆn0 ,θ−n0)−K(θˆn0 ,θ−n0) ·
1
1/σ20 + qn0
+S(θˆn0 ,θ−n0)− qn0θn0
]
.
(36)
For notation convenience, we define the function Uae :R× [θ, θ¯]×R+× [θ, θ¯]N →R+ as
Uae(θˆn0 , qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0) =
[
pi(θˆn0 ,θ−n0)−K(θˆn0 ,θ−n0)
1
1/σ20 + qn0
+S(θˆn0 ,θ−n0)− qn0θn0
]
, (37)
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where θ−n0 are the random variables of all agents’ cost type except that of agent n0. By comparing
(36) to (37), the expected payoff of the agent n is
E{x∗,yn0 ,θ−n0}
[
Ua(x∗, θˆn0 , qn0 , yn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
=Eθ−n0
[
Uae(θˆn0 , qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
.
By the mean value theorem, we have:
E
[
Uae(θn0 , qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)
]−E[Uae(θˆn0 , qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)]=E[∂Uae(η, qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)∂η
]
· (θn0 − θˆn0),
(38)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ−n0 , and η lies between θn0 and θˆn0 .
We further have:
Eθ−n0
[
∂Uae(η, qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)
∂η
]
=Eθ−n0
[
∂
∂η
(
ηQp(η,θ−n0) +
∫ θ¯
η
Qp(z,θ−n0)dz−
[
Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
]2
1/σ20 + qn0
η
+
[
Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
]
η− qn0θn0
)]
=Eθ−n0
[
2η
∂Qp(η,θ−n0)
∂η
−
[
Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
]2
1/σ20 + qn0
− 2[Q
p(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0]
1/σ20 + qn0
· ∂Q
p(η,θ−n0)
∂η
· η+ [Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ20]]
=Eθ−n0
[(
1− Q
p(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
qn0 + 1/σ
2
0
)
·
(
2η · ∂Q
p(η,θ−n0)
∂η
+Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
)]
.
(39)
If we have
−∂Q
p(η,θ−n0)/
(
Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
)
∂θn0/θn0
≥ 1
2
, (40)
then we have
2η · ∂Q
p(η,θ−n0)
∂η
+Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0 ≤ 0.
Lemma 1. If θn ∼Uniform[θ, θ¯] which is independent for every n∈A, then (40) is satisfied.
Proof : First consider the case N = 1. Since there is only one agent, hence the principal can only
select that agent. So Qp is simply Q of that agent:
Q(θ) = 1/
√
θ+F (θ)/f(θ)− 1/σ20,
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hence
−∂Q(θ)
∂θ
θ
Q(θ) + 1/σ20
=
1 + ∂
∂θ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
2[θ+F (θ)/f(θ)]
1√
θ+F (θ)/f(θ)
θ
1/
√
θ+F (θ)/f(θ)
=
1
2
1 + ∂
∂θ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
1 + 1
θ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
) ≥ 1
2
,
where the final inequality holds for uniform distribution.
We now consider N > 1. Observe that the calculation above will be violated only when the cost
parameter of some other agent is infinitesimally close to θn0 (since in that case,
∂Qp(θn0 ,θ−n0 )
∂θn0
is
different from that calculated above). However given our assumptions that the distribution of θ
follows some known distribution such as uniform and normal distributions, and given that the
number of agents N is finite, θn0 will be well separated from the cost types of all other agents with
probability 1. 
As the agent is selfish, he will exert effort qn0 to maximize his expected payoff. Hence, the agent’s
exerted effort can be obtained by taking the first order derivative of (36) with respect to qn0 and
setting it to zero, which is
(1/σ20 + q
p
n0
)2 · θˆn0 = (1/σ20 + qn0)2 · θn0 , (41)
where qpn0 is the shorthand notation for Q
p(θˆn0 ,θ−n0).
Based on (41), we have (i) if θˆn0 > θn0 , q
p
n0
< qn0 , (ii) if θˆn0 < θn0 , q
p
n0
> qn0 , and (iii) if θˆn0 = θn0 ,
qpn0 = qn0 .
Hence, If θˆn0 > θn0 , the equation (39) is negative and (38) is positive. This inequality also holds for
θˆn0 < θn0 , by a similar argument. Therefore, agent n0 will truthfully report his own cost parameter.
We then show that an agent n ∈ A, n 6= n0 will truthfully reveal his cost type. Recall that the
principal does not recruit and reward the agent n ∈ A, n 6= n0. Hence, the payment to the agent
n∈A, n 6= n0 is zero. The we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn, qn, θn,θ−n)
]−Eθ−n[Uae(θˆn, qn, θn,θ−n)]= 0,∀n∈A, n 6= n0,
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which shows that there is no difference between truthfully reporting cost type or not in terms of
expected payoff for the agent n. Without loss of generality, we assume that in this case, the agent
will truthfully report their cost types.
Step 3. Incentivize agent to exert precisely the effort as desired by the principal
under COPE
As we have proved in Step 2 that the agent n0 would truthfully report his cost type (θˆn = θn),
then we will show that the agent n0 exerts an effort level such that qn0 = q
p
n0
would maximize his
expected payoff, which is given as
E
[
Uae(θn0 , q
p
n0
, θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
= pi(θn0 ,θ−n0)−K(θn0 ,θ−n0)
1
1/σ20 + qn0
+S(θn0 ,θ−n0)− qn0θn0 ,
(42)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ−n0 .
It can be verified that (42) is concave in qn0 . Hence, by taking the first order derivative of (42)
with respect to qn0 , we have
∂
∂qn0
E
[
Uae(θn0 , q
p
n0
, θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
=
[
1/σ20 + q
p
n0
1/σ20 + qn0
]2
· θn0 − θn0 . (43)
We can verify that the value of (43) equals to zero only when qn0 = q
p
n0
. Hence, agent n0 will
exert the effort as the principal desires to maximize his expected payoff. Then (34) is rewritten as
yˆn0 =
µ0 · 1/σ20 + yn0 · qpn0
1/σ20 + q
p
n0
. (44)
Because the principal knows the value of µ0, σ
2
0, and q
p
n0
, she can infer the agent n0’s truth
observation yn0 from (44).
Step 4. Maximize the principal’s expected utility under COPE
Then we look at the expected payoff of the principal. The following lemma describes that COPE
is the optimal mechanism that maximizes the principal’s expected utility.
Lemma 2. The optimal predictor xˆ=
µ0·1/σ20+
∑
n∈A yn·qpn
1/σ20+
∑
n∈A qpn
defined in COPE maximizes the principal’s
expected utility, and the Bayes risk of the principal’s prediction is Bp
(
qp
)
= 1
1/σ20+
∑
n∈A qpn
.
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Proof : Recall that qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n). Given all agents’ observation y and agents’ exert effort qp,
the principal’s updated belief on the realization of x∗ can be expressed as
x∗|(y,qp)∼N
(
µ0 · 1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A yn · qpn
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
,
1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
)
.
To maximize the expected utility for the prediction, the principal solves
max
xˆ
E
[
v− (x∗− xˆ)2|(y,qp)]
= max
xˆ
(
v−
{
E
[
x∗2|(y,qp)]− 2xˆE[x∗|(y,qp)]+ xˆ2})
= max
xˆ
(
v−
[
xˆ− µ0 · 1/σ
2
0 +
∑
n∈A yn · qpn
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
]2
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
)
≤ v− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
The equality holds only when
xˆ=
µ0 · 1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A yn · qpn
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
. (45)
Hence, the optimal predictor that maximizes the principal’s expected utility is
xˆ
(
y,qp
)
=
µ0 · 1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A yn · qpn
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
(46)
and the Bayes risk is
Bp
(
qp
)
= inf
xˆ
E[(x∗− xˆ)2] = 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and y.
Recall that under the linear cost function, the principal only recruits agent n0 to exert effort, in
such case, qpn = 0, ∀n ∈ A, n 6= n0. Also recall that the principal can infer the true observation of
the agent n0 through the function g :R→R, and such an observation is defined as yn0 = g(yˆn0) =
yˆn0 + (yˆn0 −µ0)/(qpn0σ20). Then putting back to (46) we can get the conclusion. 
We then show that the desired effort level Qp(θn,θ−n) defined in (8) and the function pi(θn,θ−n)
defined in (9) can maximize the principal’s expected payoff and satisfy BIC and BIR conditions.
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Notice that as the agent n0 exerts effort such that qn0 = q
p
n0
and reports yˆn0 =
µ0·1/σ20+yn0 ·qpn0
1/σ20+q
p
n0
, the
expected payment function is reduced to
E{x∗,yn0 ,θ−n0}
[
R(x∗, yn0 , qn0 , θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
=Eθ−n0
[
pi(θn0 ,θ−n0)−K(θn0 ,θ−n0) ·
1
1/σ20 + qn0
+S(θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
=Eθ−n0
[
pi(θn0 ,θ−n0)
]
. (47)
For other agent n∈A, n 6= n0, as the principal does not require him to do the observation, we first
assume that the expected payment to him is as follows,
E{x∗,yn0 ,θ−n0}[R(x
∗, yn, θn,θ−n)] =Eθ−n0
[
pi(θn,θ−n)
]
,∀n∈A, n 6= n0. (48)
Later we will show that pi(θn,θ−n) = 0,∀n 6= n0.
The expected payoff of agent n∈A is
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
θˆn0 , q
p
n0
, θn0 ,θ−n0
)]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)− θnQp(θˆn,θ−n)
]
,
where qpn0 is the shorthand notation of Q
p(θˆn,θ−n). For notation convenience, we adopt
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)
in the later proof of Theorem 1, where the function Uae is rewritten
as
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)− θnQp(θˆn,θ−n)
]
. (49)
Correspondingly, BIC and BIR conditions, i.e., (5) and (6), can be rewritten as
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥Eθ−n[Uae(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn)], ∀θˆn 6= θn, (50)
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥ 0, ∀θn ∈ [θ, θ¯]. (51)
Base on Lemma 2, (47), and (48), the expected payoff of the principal is
Ex∗,y,θ[U p(x∗,qp,y, θˆ)] =−Bp
(
qp
)−Ex∗,y,θ[∑
n∈A
R(x∗, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
−Eθ
[∑
n∈A
pi(θn,θ−n)
]
.
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Recall that qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n), the principal’s optimal problem defined in (7) can be rewritten as
sup
{Qp(θ),pi(θ)},∀θn∈θ,∀n∈A
E[U p(x∗,qp,y, θˆ)],
subject to : BIC and BIR in (50) and (51).
(52)
In the following lemmas, we characterize an equivalent formulation for the feasible region defined
by BIC and BIR. Using these lemmas, we show that Qp(θn,θ−n) defined in (8) and pi(θn,θ−n)
defined in (9) are the optimal solution that solves the principal’s problem in (52).
Lemma 3. The solution of (52) is feasible if and only if it satisfies the following conditions for all
θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], ∀n∈A:
• the expected payoff of agent n is
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
Qp(x,θ−n)dx
]
; (53)
• Qp(θn,θ−n) is non-increasing in θn.
Proof : The proof of Lemma 3 is as follows. We first show that BIC and BIR imply the condition
in (53).
Notice that the first derivative of (49) is:
∂Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
∂θn
=Eθ−n
[−Qp(θˆn,θ−n)]≤ 0. (54)
Then, for any θ1n > θ
2
n, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ1n,θ−n),Q
p(θ1n,θ−n), θ
1
n)
]≤Eθ−n[Uae(pi(θ1n,θ−n),Qp(θ1n,θ−n), θ2n)]
≤Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ2n,θ−n),Q
p(θ2n,θ−n), θ
2
n)
]
;
(55)
where the first inequality is because (54) and the second is from the BIC condition defined in (50).
In other words, for the agent n∈A whose cost parameter θ≤ θn ≤ θ¯, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ¯,θ−n),Q
p(θ¯,θ−n), θ¯)
]≤Eθ−n[Uae(pi(θn,θ−n),Qp(θn,θ−n), θn)]
≤Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ,θ−n),Q
p(θ,θ−n), θ)
]
. (56)
Recall that the BIR condition is
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥ 0, ∀θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], (57)
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which implies that, for the agent n ∈ A with any value θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], his expected payoff should at
least be zero. Then the expected payoff of the agent n with cost parameter θ¯ must be binding at
zero. Otherwise, the principal can reduce the pi(θ¯,θ−n) by a small value of δ > 0, which does not
violate the constraint of (57) but raises the principal’s expected payoff. Hence, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ¯,θ−n),Q
p(θ¯,θ−n), θ¯)
]
= 0. (58)
Let Uae(θn,θ−n) =Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Qp(θn,θ−n), θn
)
. From the BIC condition, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn,θ−n)
]
= max
θˆn
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
.
By using the envelope theorem, we have:
∂Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn,θ−n)
]
∂θn
=
∂Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn)
]
∂θn
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆn=θn
=Eθ−n
[−Qp(θn,θ−n)],
(59)
where θn is a parameter. By integrating both sides from the value of θn to θ¯ and using (58) and
the assumption that the random variable θn of the agent n is independent for every n∈A , we get
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
Qp(x,θ−n)dx
]
. (60)
We prove that Qp(θn,θn) is nonincreasing in θn by contradiction. Let pn be the shorthand
notation for pi(θn,θ−n). Suppose for any θ1n > θ
2
n, we have Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)>Q
p(θ2n,θ−n). Because
∂2Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θn
)
∂qpn∂θn
=−1< 0, (61)
∂2Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θn
)
∂qpn
2 = 0, (62)
we have
0 =
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
1
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)
=
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
1
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
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<
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
2
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
, (63)
where the first equality is due to BIC when the agent n’s cost parameter θn has the value of θ
1
n,
the second equality is due to (62), and the inequality is due to (61).
However, based on the BIC condition, if the agent n’s cost parameter θn has the value of θ
2
n,
then we should have
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
2
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
= 0,
which holds true for all scalar values of pn. Hence, for any θ
1
n > θ
2
n, Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)≤Qp(θ2n,θ−n).
Then we need to prove that (53) implies BIC and BIR defined in (50) and (51).
BIR is verified by putting θn back to (53). Besides, by putting θn = θ¯ back to (53), we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θ¯,θ−n),Q
p(θ¯,θ−n), θ¯
)]
= 0.
Then we prove that (53) implies BIC. Notice that we have:
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
1
=Eθ−n
[
−
∫ θ¯
θn
∂Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
2
=Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θˆn
)−∫ θˆn
θn
∂Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
3
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θˆn
Qp(η,θ−n)dη−
∫ θˆn
θn
∂Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
4
=Eθ−n
[
−
∫ θn
θ¯
Qp(η,θ−n)dη−
∫ θˆn
θn
Qp(η,θ−n)dη+
∫ θˆn
θn
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)dz
]
5
=Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)
+
∫ θˆ
θn
(
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)−Qp(η,θ−n)
)
dη
]
,
where the third equality and the fifth equality are obtained by (53).
If θˆn > θn, then the above equation is non-positive (because Q
p(η,θ−n) is non-increasing in η),
hence
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn)
]
<Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn)
]
.
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This inequality also holds for θˆn < θn by a similar argument. Therefore, the two condition imply
BIC. 
Then based on Lemma 3, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. The optimisation problem in (52) has the following equivalent formulation:
max
{Qp(θ)},∀θn∈θ
Eθ
[
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈AQ
p(θn,θ−n)
−
∑
n∈A
Qp(θn,θ−n) · θn−
∑
n∈A
Qp(θn,θ−n) · F (θn)
f(θn)
]
,
s.t. Qp(θn,θ−n) is nonincreasing in θn, (64)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ.
Proof : The proof of Lemma 4 is as follows. The expected payoff of the principal can be written
as:
Eθ
[
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈AQ
p(θn,θ−n)
−
∑
n∈A
Qp(θn,θ−n) · θn−
∑
n∈A
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ
[
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈AQ
p(θn,θ−n)
−
∑
n∈A
Qp(θn,θ−n) · θn−
∑
n∈A
∫ θ¯
θn
Qp(x,θ−n)dx
]
,
(65)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ. Notice that
Eθn
[∫ θ¯
θn
Qp(x,θ−n)dx
]
=
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
z
Qp(x,θ−n)dx · f(z)dz =
∫ θ¯
θ
F (z)Qp(z,θ−n)dz
=
∫ θ¯
θ
F (z)
f(z)
Qp(z,θ−n)f(z)dz =Eθn
[F (θn)
f(θn)
Qp(θn,θ−n)
]
,
where the first equation is obtained by using integration by parts. Then by applying the above equa-
tion to (126) and the fact that {θn}n∈A are assumed to be random, independently and identically
distributed on support [θ, θ¯], we can get the conclusion. 
Based on Lemma 4, the principal’s problem reduces to choosing the desired effort qpn =
Qp(θn,θ−n) for each agent n ∈A. We first consider the problem in (64) without the constraint. If
the optimal solution to this unconstrained problem is increasing, then it is also an optimal solution
to the constrained problem.
Lemma 5. Qp(θn,θ−n) defined in (8) and pi(θn,θ−n) defined in (9) are the optimal solution that
solves the principal’s problem in (52)
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Proof : We first prove that for the agent ∀n∈A,
Qp(θn,θ−n) =
{
max{1/√γ(θn)− 1/σ20,0}, if n0 = argminm∈Aθm,
0, otherwise,
is the optimal solution of (64) by contradiction.
As qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n), the problem in (64) is equivalent to
min
qp≥0
1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
+
∑
n∈A
qpn · γ(θn),
s.t. qpn is nonincreasing in θn, (66)
where γ(θn) = θn +F (θn)/f(θn).
Without loss of generality, let γ(θ1)≤ γ(θ2) . . .≤ γ(θN). If the principal’s desired efforts from all
agents are positive, then the solution is
qp1 = q
p,∗
1 , q
p
2 = q
p,∗
2 , . . . , q
p
N = q
p,∗
N . (67)
Suppose that there is another solution such that
qp,†1 = q
p
1 + q
p
j ,
qp,†i = q
p
i , ∀i 6= 1, j, i∈A,
qp,†j = 0.
(68)
Then we can verify that
∑
n∈A
qp,†n =
∑
n∈A
qpn and
∑
n∈A
(
qp,†n · γ(θn)
)≤∑
n∈A
(
qpn · γ(θn)
)
.
Hence, (67) is not an optimal solution. Then we let qpn = 0,∀n> 1, the problem in (66) becomes
min
qp1
1
1/σ20 + q
p
1
+ qp1 · γ(θ1),
s.t. qp1 ≥ 0. (69)
By solving the above problem we can get that qp1 = max{1/
√
γ(θ1)−1/σ20,0}. As we define n0 =
argminm∈Aθm and the assumption that F is log-concave in [θ, θ¯], we have qpn0 = max{1/
√
γ(θn0)−
1/σ20,0}.
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According to (53), we have
Eθ−n
[
pi(θn,θ−n)−Qp(θn,θ−n) · θn
]
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
Qp(x,θ−n)dx
]
.
Then the optimal payment function given the agent n0 and 1/
√
γ(θn0)− 1/σ20 ≥ 0 is
pi(θn0) = θn0/
√
γ(θn0)− θn0/σ20 +
∫ θ¯
θn0
(
1√
γ(z)
− 1
σ20
)
dz = θn0/
√
γ(θn0)− θ¯/σ20 +
∫ θ¯
θn0
1√
γ(z)
dz,
and the payment will be zero if 1/
√
γ(θn0)− 1/σ20 < 0.
For other agents, the payments will be zero as they are not involved in the observation and
prediction. 
As in Theorem 1 , we assume that θn ∼ Uniform[θ, θ¯], which is independent for every n ∈ A.
Putting the expression of F and f back to the above equations, we can have the conclusion.
B. Proof of Theorem 2: Quadratic Costs
The proof is similar to that in Section A. The difference is as follows.
First, the function pi : [θ, θ¯]N →R+, K,S : [θ, θ¯]N ×R+→R+ are defined as
pi(θˆn,θ−n) =
1
2
·
[
θˆn ·
[
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)
]2
+
∫ θ¯
θˆn
([
Qp(z,θ−n)
]2)
dz
]
, (70)
K(θˆn,θ−n) =
[
Qp(θˆn,θ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
]2
θˆn ·Qp(θˆn,θ−n), (71)
S(θˆn,θ−n) =
[
Qp(θˆn,θ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
]
θˆn ·Qp(θˆn,θ−n). (72)
Step 1. Truthful reporting of observation under COPE
We will analyze the strategies of the agent n, ∀n∈A. We will show that the agent n will choose
yˆn =
µ0 · 1/σ20 + yn · qn
1/σ20 + qn
(73)
to maximize his expected payoff given his exerting effort qn and own observation yn.
As pi(θˆn,θ−n), K(θˆn,θ−n) and S(θˆn,θ−n) are independent of yˆn and the value of calculated by
K(θˆn,θ−n) is always positive. Hence, when the agent n makes reporting observation strategy to
maximize his expected payoff, i.e.,
yˆn ∈ argmaxE
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)−K(θˆn,θ−n)(x∗− yˆn)2 +S(θˆn,θ−n)
]−C(qn, θn),
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where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and cost parameters θ−n =
[θ1, . . . , θn−1, θn+1, . . . , θN ]T except agent n, it is equivalent for the agent n to choose reporting
strategy such that
yˆn ∈ argminEx∗ [(x∗− yˆn)2]. (74)
The value of Ex∗ [(x∗ − yˆn)2] is minimized when yˆn = µ0·1/σ
2
0+yn·qn
1/σ20+qn
. The expected value in this
case is
Ex∗ [(x∗− yˆn)2] = 1
1/σ20 + qn
.
Step 2. Truthful reporting of cost parameter under COPE
We will show that the agent n, ∀n∈A will truthfully reveals his cost type. The expected payoff
of the agent who has a cost type is θn but reports θˆn is:
E{x∗,yn,θ−n}
[
Ua(x∗, θˆn, qn, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)−K(θˆn,θ−n) · 1
1/σ20 + qn
+S(θˆn,θ−n)− 1
2
θnq
2
n
]
.
(75)
For notation convenience, we define
Ua(θˆn, qn, θn,θ−n) =
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)− K(θˆn,θ−n)
1/σ20 + qn
+S(θˆn,θ−n)− 1
2
θnq
2
n
]
By the mean value theorem, we have:
E
[
Ua(θn, qn, θn,θ−n)
]
−E
[
Ua(θˆn, qn, θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[∂Ua(η, qn, θn,θ−n)
∂η
]
(θn− θˆn), (76)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ−n, and η lies between θn and θˆn.
We further have
Eθ−n
[
∂Ua(η, qn, θn,θ−n)
∂η
]
=Eθ−n0
[
∂
∂η
(
1
2
· η[Qp(η,θ−n)]2 +∫ θ¯
η
[
Qp(z,θ−n)
]2
dz
+
[
Qp(η,θ−n0) + 1/σ
2
0
]
η
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]− [Qp(η,θ−n) + 1/σ20]2
1/σ20 + qn
η
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]− 1
2
θnq
2
n
)]
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=Eθ−n
[(
1− Q
p(η,θ−n) + 1/σ20
qn + 1/σ20
)(
2Qp(η,θ−n) · η · ∂Q
p(η,θ−n)
∂η
+
[
Qp(η,θ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
] ·Qp(η,θ−n)
+
[
Qp(η,θ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
] · η · ∂
∂η
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
])− 1
2
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]2]
. (77)
We can check that if
−∂Q
p(η,θ−n)/(Qp(η,θ−n) + 1/σ20)
∂θn/θn
≥ 1
2
,∀n∈A, (78)
we have
2Qp(η,θ−n) · η · ∂Q
p(η,θ−n)
∂η
+
[
Qp(η,θ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
] ·Qp(η,θ−n)≤ 0.
Later we will show that Qp(η,θ−n) is non-increasing in η, ∀n∈A (i.e., Lemma 7), hence,
2Qp(η,θ−n)η
∂Qp(η,θ−n)
∂η
+
[
Qp(η,θ−n) + 1/σ
2
0
]
Qp(η,θ−n) +
η
σ20
∂
∂η
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]≤ 0.
Lemma 6. If θn ∼Uniform[θ, θ¯] which is independent for every n∈A, then (78) is satisfied.
Proof : First, for an agent n∈A,
Qp(θn,θ−n) =
1
θn +
F (θn)
f(θn)
· 1[
W (θ)
]2 , (79)
where the function W : [θ, θ¯]N →R+ is the solution of the below equation:
[
W (θ)
]3− 1
σ20
· [W (θ)]2−∑
m∈A
1
θm +
F (θm)
f(θm)
= 0. (80)
hence
−∂Q
p(θn,θ−n)
∂θn
θn
Qp(θn,θ−n) + 1/σ20
≥
1 + ∂
∂θ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
1 + 1
θ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
) · 1
1 + [W (θ)]
2
σ20
(
θn +
F (θn)
f(θn)
)
≥ 1
2
,
where the final inequality holds for uniform distribution. 
As the agent is selfish, he will exert effort qn0 to maximize his expected payoff. Hence, the agent’s
exerted effort can be obtained by taking the first order derivative of (75) with respect to qn and
setting it to zero, which is
(1/σ20 + q
p
n)
2 · qpn · θˆn = (1/σ20 + qn)2 · qn · θn, (81)
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where qpn is a shorthand for Q
p(θˆn,θ−n).
Based on (81), we have (i) if θˆn > θn, q
p
n < qn, (ii) if θˆn < θn, q
p
n > qn, and (iii) if θˆn = θn, q
p
n = qn.
Then if θˆn > θn, the equation (77) is negative and (76) is positive. This inequality also holds for
θˆn < θn, by a similar argument. Therefore, the agent n will truthfully report his own cost type.
Step 3. Incentivize agents to exert precisely the efforts as desired by the principal
under COPE
Then we will show that an agent n, ∀n ∈A exerts effort such that qn = qpn would maximize his
expected payoff as follows.
E{x∗,yn,θ−n}
[
Ua(x∗, qn, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θn,θ−n)−K(θn,θ−n) · 1
1/σ20 + qn
+S(θn,θ−n)− 1
2
θnq
2
n
]
,
(82)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ−n, x∗, and yn.
It can be verified that (82) is concave in qn. Hence, by taking the first order derivative of (82)
with respect to qn, we have
∂
∂qn
E
[
Ua(x∗, qn, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=
[
1/σ20 + q
p
n
1/σ20 + qn
]2
· θn · qpn− θn0 · qn. (83)
We can verify that the value of (83) equals to zero only when qn = q
p
n. Hence, agent n will exert
the effort as the principal desires to maximize his expected payoff. Then (73) is rewritten as
yˆn =
µ0 · 1/σ20 + yn · qpn
1/σ20 + q
p
n
. (84)
Because the principal knows the value of µ0, σ
2
0, and q
p
n, she can infer the agent n’s truth
observation yn from (84).
Step 4. Maximize the principal’s expected utility under COPE Then we look at the
expected payoff of the principal. We will show that the desired effort level Qp(θn,θ−n) defined in
(12) and the function pi(θn,θ−n) defined in (70) can maximize the principal’s expected payoff and
satisfy BIC and BIR condition.
Notice that when an agent n, ∀n∈A exerts effort such that qn = qpn and reports yˆn = µ0·1/σ
2
0+yn·qpn
1/σ20+q
p
n
,
the expected payment function is reduced to
E{x∗,yn,θ−n}
[
R(x∗, yn, qn, θn,θ−n)
]
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=Eθ−n
[
pi(θn,θ−n)−K(θn,θ−n)(x∗− yˆn)2 +S(θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θn,θ−n)
]
. (85)
The expected payoff of the agent n is rewritten as
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)− 1
2
θn ·
[
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)
]2]
, (86)
and the BIC and BIR conditions, i.e., (5) and (6), can be rewritten as
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥Eθ−n[Ua(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn)], ∀θˆn 6= θn, (87)
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥ 0, ∀θn. (88)
Base on Lemma 2 and (85), the expected payoff of the principal is
Ex∗,y,θ[U p(x∗,qp,y, θˆ)] =−Bp
(
qp
)−Ex∗,y,θ[∑
n∈A
R(x∗, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
−Eθ
[∑
n∈A
pi(θn,θ−n)
]
.
Recall that qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n), the principal’s optimal problem defined in (7) can be rewritten as
sup
{Qp(θ),pi(θ)},∀θn∈θ,∀n∈A
E[U p(x∗,qp,y, θˆ)],
subject to : BIC and BIR in (87) and (88).
(89)
In the following lemmas, we characterize an equivalent formulation for the feasible region defined
by BIC and BIR. Using these lemmas, we show that Qp(θn,θ−n) defined in (12) and pi(θn,θ−n)
defined in (70) are the optimal solution that solves the principal’s problem in (89).
Lemma 7. The solution of (89) is feasible if and only if it satisfies the following conditions for all
θn ∈ [θ, θ¯]:
• The expected payoff of the agent n, ∀n∈A is
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=
1
2
Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
[
Qp(x,θ−n)
]2
dx
]
, (90)
• Qp(θn,θ−n) is non-increasing in θn.
Proof : The proof of Lemma 7 is as follows. We first show that BIC and BIR imply the condition
in (90).
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Notice that the first derivative of (86) is:
∂Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
∂θn
=Eθ−n
[− 1
2
[
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)
]2]≤ 0. (91)
Then, for any θ1n > θ
2
n, we have
Eθ−n
[
Ua(pi(θ1n,θ−n),Q
p(θ1n,θ−n), θ
1
n)
]≤Eθ−n[Ua(pi(θ1n,θ−n),Qp(θ1n,θ−n), θ2n)]
≤Eθ−n
[
Ua(pi(θ2n,θ−n),Q
p(θ2n,θ−n), θ
2
n)
]
,
(92)
where the first inequality is due to (91) and the second is due to the BIC condition defined in (87).
Recall that the BIR condition is
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥ 0, ∀θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], (93)
which implies that, for an agent n ∈ A with any value θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], his expected payoff should be
nonnegative. Then the expected payoff of the agent n with cost parameter θ¯ must be binding at
zero. Otherwise, the principal can raise the pi(θ¯,θ−n) by a small value of δ > 0, which does not
violate the constraint of (93) but raises the principal’s expected payoff. Hence, we have
Eθ−n
[
Ua(pi(θ¯,θ−n),Q
p(θ¯,θ−n), θ¯)
]
= 0. (94)
Let Ua(θn,θ−n) =Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Qp(θn,θ−n), θn
)
. From BIC condition, we have
Eθ−n
[
Ua(θn,θ−n)
]
= max
θˆn
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
.
By using the envelope theorem, we have:
∂Eθ−n
[
Ua(θn,θ−n)
]
∂θn
=
∂Eθ−n
[
Ua(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn)
]
∂θn
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆn=θn
=Eθ−n
[
− 1
2
[
Qp(θn,θ−n)
]2]
,
where θn is a parameter. By integrating both sides from the value of θn to θ¯ and using (94), we get
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=
1
2
Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
[
Qp(x,θ−n)
]2
dx
]
(95)
We prove thatQp(θn,θn) is nonincreasing in θn by contradiction. Let pn as the shorthand notation
for pi(θn,θ−n). Suppose for any θ1n > θ
2
n, we have Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)>Q
p(θ2n,θ−n). Because
∂2Ua
(
pn, q
p
n, θn
)
∂qpn∂θn
=−qpn < 0, and (96)
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∂2Ua
(
pn, q
p
n, θn
)
∂qpn
2 =−θn ≤ 0, (97)
we have
0 =
∂Ua
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
1
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)
≤ ∂U
a
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
1
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
<
∂Ua
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
2
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
,
where the first equality is due to BIC when the agent n’s cost parameter θn has the value of θ
1
n,
the second equality is due to(96), and the inequality is due to (97).
However, based on the BIC condition, if the agent n’s cost parameter θn has the value of θ
2
n,
then we should have
∂Ua
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
2
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
= 0,
which holds true for all scalar value of pn. Hence, for any θ
1
n > θ
2
n, Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)≤Qp(θ2n,θ−n).
Then we need to prove that (90) implies BIC and BIR defined in (87) and (88). Notice that we
have:
Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[
−
∫ θ¯
θn
∂Ua
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
=Eθ−n
[
1
2
∫ θ¯
θˆn
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]2
dη−
∫ θˆn
θn
∂Ua
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
=Eθ−n
[
− 1
2
∫ θn
θ¯
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]2
dη− 1
2
∫ θˆn
θn
[
Qp(η,θ−n)
]2
dη+
1
2
∫ θˆn
θn
[
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)
]2
dz
]
=Eθ−n
[
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)
+
1
2
∫ θˆ
θn
([
Qp(θˆn,θ−n)
]2− [Qp(η,θ−n)]2)dη],
where the second equality and the forth equality is obtained by (90).
If θˆn > θn, then the above equation is non-positive (because Q
p(η,θ−n) is non-increasing in η),
hence
Eθ−n
[
Ua(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn)
]
<Eθ−n
[
Ua(pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn)
]
.
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This inequality also holds for θˆn < θn by a similar argument. Therefore, the two condition imply
BIC.
BIR is verified by putting θn back to (90). 
Then based on Lemma 7, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 8. The optimisation problem in (89) has the following equivalent formulation:
max
{Qp(θ)},∀θn∈θ
Eθ
[
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈AQ
p(θn,θ−n)
− 1
2
∑
n∈A
[
Qp(θn,θ−n)
]2
θn− 1
2
∑
n∈A
[
Qp(θn,θ−n)
]2F (θn)
f(θn)
]
,
s.t. Qp(θn,θ−n) is nonincreasing in θn. (98)
Proof : The proof of Lemma 8 is as follows. The expected payoff of the principal can be written
as:
Eθ
[
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈AQ
p(θn,θ−n)
− 1
2
∑
n∈A
[
Qp(θn,θ−n)
]2 · θn−∑
n∈A
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ
[
− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈AQ
p(θn,θ−n)
− 1
2
∑
n∈A
[
Qp(θn,θ−n)
]2− 1
2
∑
n∈A
∫ θ¯
θn
[
Qp(x,θ−n)
]2
dx
]
Using integration by parts and Lemma 7, we can get the conclusion. 
Based on Lemma 8, the principal’s problem thus reduces to choosing the desired effort
Qp(θn,θ−n) for each agent n∈A.
Let qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n) and
M
(
qp1, . . . , q
p
N
)
=− 1
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
− 1
2
∑
n∈A
[
qpn
]2 · θn− 1
2
∑
n∈A
[
qpn
]2F (θn)
f(θn)
.
Let G= [∂2M/∂qpi ∂q
p
j ] be the matrix of second order derivatives, and it is a symmetric matrix with
negative diagonal terms as
∂2M
∂qpi ∂q
p
j
=− 2[
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
]3 , j 6= i,
∂2M
∂qpi
2 =−
2[
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
]3 − θi− F (θi)f(θi) .
As we can verify that, for k = 1, . . . ,N , the kth leading principal minors of G alternate in sign,
hence G is negative definite and M is strictly concave. Thus, the principal’s desired effort levels
from agents qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n), ∀n∈N are the solution of the below equations:
1[
1/σ20 +
∑
n∈A q
p
n
]2 −Qp(θn,θ−n) · θn−Qp(θn,θ−n) · F (θn)f(θn) = 0, n= 1,2, . . . ,N (99)
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Using Cramer’s rule and the assumption that the function F is log concave in θ , we can verify
that
∂Qp(θn,θ−n)
∂θn
=−∂
2M/∂qpn∂θn
∂2M/∂qpn
2 ≤ 0, (100)
which shows that Qp(θn,θ−n) derived from (99) is non-increasing in θn, so that it is the feasible
solution of (98).
The solution of (99) is
Qp(θn,θ−n) =
1
θn +
F (θn)
f(θn)
· 1[
W (θ)
]2 , (101)
where the function W : [θ, θ¯]N →R+ is the solution of the below equation:
[
W (θ)
]3− 1
σ20
· [W (θ)]2−∑
m∈A
1
θm +
F (θm)
f(θm)
= 0. (102)
The real root of the above cubic equation is as follows.
W (θˆ) =
1
3σ20
+ 3
√√√√ 1
27σ60
+
1
2
[∑
m∈A
1
θˆm +
F (θˆm)
f(θˆm)
]
+
√
λ(θˆ) + 3
√√√√ 1
27σ60
+
1
2
[∑
m∈A
1
θˆm +
F (θˆm)
f(θˆm)
]
−
√
λ(θˆ),
(103)
where function λ : [θ, θ¯]N →R+ is given as
λ(θˆ) =
1
27σ60
[∑
m∈A
1
θˆm +
F (θˆm)
f(θˆm)
]
+
1
4
[∑
m∈A
1
θˆm +
F (θˆm)
f(θˆm)
]2
.
According to (90), we have
Eθ−n
[
pi(θn,θ−n)− 1
2
· [Qp(θn,θ−n)]2 · θn
]
=
1
2
Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
[
Qp(x,θ−n)
]2
dx
]
.
From the above equation, we can derive the optimal payment function as given in (70).
C. Proof of Theorem 3: General Setting
The proof will proceed in four steps. The first three steps show that our mechanism incentivizes the
agents to be truthful, and the fourth step proves optimality of our mechanism. First, we show that
irrespective of what an agent reports as his cost parameter, and irrespective of the effort he exerts,
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the agent is always incentivized to report his true observation. We follow this up and show that
irrespective of the effort that an agent exerts, he is always incentivized to report his cost parameter
correctly. The third step completes the proof of truthfulness, showing that under truthful reporting
of the cost parameter and the observation, in our mechanism, an agent is always incentivized to
exert precisely the effort as desired by the principal. Finally, we show that among all mechanisms
that ensure truthful reports, our mechanism maximizes the principal’s expected utility.
Step 1. Truthful reporting of observation under COPE
We first show that the agent will choose
yn = arg infyˆn(yn)E
[
`a(x∗, yˆn)
]
. (104)
to maximize his expected payoff, given his exerting effort qn and own observation yn.
As shown in (22), pi(θˆn,θ−n), K(θˆn,θ−n) and S(θˆn,θ−n) are independent of yˆn. Moreover, the
value ofK(θˆn,θ−n) is always positive. Hence, when the agent n determines his reporting observation
strategy to maximize his expected payoff, i.e.,
yˆn ∈ argmaxE
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)−K(θˆn,θ−n) · `a(x∗, yˆn) +S(θˆn,θ−n)
]−C(qn, θn),
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and cost parameters θ−n =
[θ1, . . . , θn−1, θn+1, . . . , θN ]T of all the agents except agent n, it is equivalent for the agent n to choose
the reporting strategy such that
yˆn ∈ argminEx∗ [`a(x∗, yˆn)]. (105)
According to (18) and (19) in Section 4.2.1, the value of Ex∗ [`a(x∗, yˆn)] is minimized when yˆn = yn,
and the expected value is
Ex∗ [`a(x∗, yˆn)] =Ba
(
qn
)
.
Step 2. Truthful reporting of cost parameter under COPE
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We now show that the agent will truthfully reveals its cost type. The expected payoff of the
agent whose cost type is θn0 but reports θˆn0 is:
E{x∗,yn,θ−n}
[
Ua(x∗, θˆn, qn, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)−K(θˆn,θ−n) ·Ba
(
qn
)
+S(θˆn,θn)−C(qn, θn)
]
.
(106)
For notational convenience, we define the function Uae :R× [θ, θ¯]×R+× [θ, θ¯]N →R+ as
Uae(θˆn, qn, θn,θ−n) =
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)−K(θˆn,θ−n) ·Ba
(
qn
)
+S(θˆn,θn)−C(qn, θn)
]
, (107)
where θ−n are the random variables of all agents cost type except that of agent n. By comparing
(106) to (107), the expected payoff of the agent n is
E{x∗,yn,θ−n}
[
Ua(x∗, θˆn, qn, yn, θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[
Uae(θˆn, qn, θn,θ−n)
]
.
Then, by the mean value theorem, we have:
Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn, θn,θ−n)
]
−Eθ−n
[
Uae(θˆn, θn,θ−n)
]
=Eθ−n
[
∂Uae(η, θn,θ−n)
∂η
]
· (θn− θˆn)
We further have:
Eθ−n
[
∂Uae(η, θn,θ−n)
∂η
]
=E
[
Ba(qn)
dBa(qpn)/dq
p
n
·
(
1− B
a(qpn)
Ba(qn)
)
·
(
∂c(qpn, η)
∂η
− c(q
p
n, η)
dBa(qpn)/dq
p
n
· d
2Ba(qpn)
dqpn
2 ·
∂qpn
∂η
)] (108)
As the agent is selfish, he will exert effort qn to maximize his expected payoff. Hence, the agent’s
exerted effort can be obtained by taking the first order derivative of (107) with respect to qn and
setting it to zero, which is
dBa
(
qn
)
dqn
· c(qpn, θˆn) =
dBa
(
qpn
)
dqpn
· c(qn, θn) (109)
As we assume that dB
a(z)
dz
≤ 0, then based on (109), we have (i) if θˆn > θn, qpn < qn, (ii) if θˆn < θn,
qpn > qn, and (iii) if θˆn = θn, q
p
n = qn.
As we assume that dBa(qpn)/dq
p
n ≤ 0, d2Ba(qpn)/dqpn2 > 0, and later we will prove in Lemma
10 that Qp(θn,θ−n) is nonincreasing in θn, if (26) holds, i.e., ∂c (Qp(η,θ−n), η)/∂η 6 0, then the
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above equation (108) is negative when θˆn > θn. Based on this, we have Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn, θn,θ−n)
]
>
Eθ−n
[
Uae(θˆn, θn,θ−n)
]
. This inequality also holds for θˆn < θn, by a similar argument. Therefore, an
agent will truthfully report his own cost parameter.
Step 3. Incentivize agent to exert precisely the effort as desired by the principal
under COPE As we have proved in Step 2 that the agent n would truthfully report his cost type
(θˆn = θn). Next we will show that the agent n exerts effort such that qn = q
p
n would maximize his
expected payoff as follows.
E
[
Uae(x∗, qpn, yn, θˆn, θˆ−n)
]
= pi(θˆn, θˆ−n)−K(θˆn) ·Ba
(
qn
)
+S(θˆn)−C(qn, θn), (110)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ−n.
It can be verified that (110) is concave in qn as we assume that
d2Ba
(
qn
)
dqn
2 ≥ 0.
Hence, by taking the first order derivative of (110) with respect to qn, we have
∂
∂qn
E
[
Uae(x∗, qpn, yn, θˆnθˆ−n)
]
=
c
(
qpn, θˆn
)
dBa
(
qpn
)
/dqpn
· dB
a
(
qn
)
dqn
− c(qn, θn). (111)
We can verify that the value of (111) equals to zero when qn = q
p
n. Hence, agent n will exert the
effort as the principal desires to maximize his expected payoff.
Step 4. Maximize the principal’s expected utility under COPE
Then we look at the expected payoff of the principal. To maximize the expected utility for the
prediction, the principal solves
max
xˆ
E
[− `p(x∗, xˆ(y,qp)|(yˆn,qp)]. (112)
The principal employs the Bayes estimate xˆ as follows:
xˆ
(
yˆ,q∗
)
= arg infxˆE
[
`p
(
x∗, xˆ(yˆ,qp)
)]
. (113)
It follows that the expected utility of the principal is
Bp
(
qp
)
= inf
xˆ
E
[
`p
(
x∗, xˆ(y,qp)
)]
. (114)
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We then show that the desired effort level Qp(θˆn, θˆ−n) defined as the solution of (125) and the
function pi(θˆn, θˆ−n) defined in (23) can maximize the principal’s expected payoff and satisfy BIC
and BIR conditions.
Notice that agent n exerts effort such that qn = q
p
n and reports yn ∈ argminEx∗ [`a(x∗, yˆn)], the
expected payment function defined in (22) is reduced to
E[R(x∗, yn, θn,θ−n)] = pi(θn,θ−n),
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and yn.
Then the expected payoff of agent n is rewritten as
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[
pi(θˆn,θ−n)−C
(
Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
, (115)
and the BIC and BIR conditions, i.e., (5) and (6) can be rewritten as
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥Eθ−n[Uae(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn)] ∀θˆn 6= θn, (116)
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥ 0, ∀θn. (117)
Then the expected payoff of the principal is
E[U p(x∗,qp,y,θ)] =−Bp(qp)−∑
n∈A
pi(θn,θ−n)
where the expectation is taken with respect to x∗ and y.
Recall that qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n), we then rewrite (7) as
sup
{Qp(θ),pi(θ)},∀θn∈θ
E[U p(x∗,qp,y, θˆ)],
subject to : BIC and BIR in (116) and (117).
(118)
For the feasible region defined by BIC and BIR, we can characterise an equivalent formulation
in the following lemma:
Lemma 9. The solution of (118) is feasible if and only if it satisfies the following conditions for
all θn ∈ [θ, θ¯]:
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• The expected payoff of agent n is
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
∂C
(
Qp(z,θ−n), η
)
∂η
dz
]
, (119)
• Qp(θn,θ−n) is non-increasing in θn.
Proof : We first show that BIC and BIR imply the condition 119.
The first derivative of (115) is
∂Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θˆ,θ−n),Qp(θˆ,θ−n), η)
]
∂η
=Eθ−n
[
− ∂C(Q
p(θˆ,θ−n), η)
∂η
]
≤ 0. (120)
Then, for any θ1n > θ
2
n, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ1n,θ−n),Q
p(θ1n,θ−n), θ
1
n)
]≤Eθ−n[Uae(pi(θ1n,θ−n),Qp(θ1n,θ−n), θ2n)]
≤Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ2n,θ−n),Q
p(θ2n,θ−n), θ
2
n)
]
,
(121)
where the first inequality is due to (120) and the second is from the BIC condition defined in (116).
Recall that the BIR condition is
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]≥ 0, ∀θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], (122)
which implies that, for the agent n ∈ A with any value θn ∈ [θ, θ¯], his expected payoff should be
nonnegative. Then the expected payoff of the agent n with cost parameter θ¯ must be binding at
zero. Otherwise, the principal can reduce the pi(θ¯,θ−n) by a small value of δ > 0, which does not
violate the constraint of (122) but raises the principal’s expected payoff. Hence, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θ¯,θ−n),Q
p(θ¯,θ−n), θ¯)
]
= 0. (123)
Let Uae(θn,θ−n) =Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Qp(θn,θ−n), θn
)
. From BIC condition, we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn,θ−n)
]
= max
θˆn
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
.
By using the envelope theorem, we have:
∂Eθ−n
[
Uae(θn,θ−n)
]
∂η
=
∂Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), θn)
]
∂θn
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆn=θn
=Eθ−n
[
− ∂C(Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn)
∂θn
]
,
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where θn is a parameter. By integrating both sides from θn to θ¯ and using (123) and the assumption
that the random variable θn of the agent n is independent for every n∈A, we get
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
∂C(Qp(z,θ−n), η)
∂η
dz
]
. (124)
We prove thatQp(θn,θn) is nonincreasing in θn by contradiction. Let pn as the shorthand notation
for pi(θn,θ−n). Suppose for any θ1n > θ
2
n, we have Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)>Q
p(θ2n,θ−n). Because
∂2Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θn
)
∂qpn∂θn
=−∂c(q, θn)
∂θn
< 0, and
∂2Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θn
)
∂qpn
2 =−
∂c(q, θn)
∂q
< 0,
we then have
0 =
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
1
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)
<
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
1
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
<
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
2
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
,
where the equality is due to BIC when the agent n’s cost parameter θn has the value of θ
1
n, the
second equality is due to (C), and the inequality is due to (C).
However, based on the BIC condition, if the agent n’s cost parameter θn has the value of θ
2
n,
then we should have
∂Uae
(
pn, q
p
n, θ
2
n
)
∂qpn
∣∣∣∣∣
qpn=Q
p(θ2n,θ−n)
= 0,
which holds true for all scalar values of pn. Hence, for any θ
1
n > θ
2
n, Q
p(θ1n,θ−n)≤Qp(θ2n,θ−n).
Then we need to prove that ((119)) implies BIC and BIR defined in ((116)) and ((117)).
BIR is verified by putting θn back to (119). Besides, by putting θn = θ¯ back to (119), we have
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θ¯,θ−n),Q
p(θ¯,θ−n), θ¯
)]
= 0.
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Then we prove that ((119)) implies BIC. Notice that we have:
Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn
)]
1
=Eθ−n
[
−
∫ θ¯
θn
∂Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
2
=Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θˆn
)−∫ θˆn
θn
∂Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
3
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θˆn
∂C(Qp(η,θ−n), z)
∂z
dη−
∫ θˆn
θn
∂Uae
(
pi(θˆn,θ−n),Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z
)
∂z
dz
]
4
=Eθ−n
[
−
∫ θn
θ¯
∂C(Qp(η,θ−n), z)
∂z
dη−
∫ θˆn
θn
∂C(Qp(η,θ−n), z)
∂z
dη+
∫ θˆn
θn
∂C(Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z)
∂z
dz
]
5
=Eθ−n
[
Uae
(
pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn
)
+
∫ θˆ
θn
(
∂C(Qp(θˆn,θ−n), z)
∂z
− ∂C(Q
p(η,θ−n), z)
∂z
)
dη
]
,
where the third equality and the fifth equality is obtained by (119).
If θˆn > θn, then the above equation is non-positive. This is because Q
p(η,θ−n) is non-increasing
in η and ∂C(q, θ)/∂θ > 0. Hence,
Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θˆn,θ−n),Q
p(θˆn,θ−n), θn)
]
<Eθ−n
[
Uae(pi(θn,θ−n),Q
p(θn,θ−n), θn)
]
.
This inequality also holds for θˆn < θn by a similar argument. Therefore, the two condition imply
BIC. 
Then based on Lemma 9 and let qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n), we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 10. The optimisation problem in (118) has the following equivalent formulation:
max
qp
Eθ
[
−Bp(qp)−∑
n∈A
C
(
qpn, θn
)−∑
n∈A
∂C
(
qpn, θn
)
∂θn
· F (θn)
f(θn)
]
s.t. qpn is nonincreasing in θn,∀n∈A. (125)
where the expectation is taken with respect to θ.
proof : The proof of Lemma 4 is as follows. The expected payoff of the principal can be written
as:
Eθ
[
−Bp(qp)−∑
n∈A
C
(
qpn, θn
)−∑
n∈A
Ua
(
pi(θn,θ−n), q
p
n, θn
)]
=Eθ
[
−Bp(qp)−∑
n∈A
C
(
qpn, θn
)−∑
n∈A
∫ θ¯
θn
∂C
(
qpn, η
)
∂η
dx
]
,
(126)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to θ. Notice that
Eθn
[∫ θ¯
θn
∂C
(
qpn, η
)
∂η
dx
]
=
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
z
∂C
(
qpn, η
)
∂η
dx · f(z)dz =
∫ θ¯
θ
F (z)
∂C
(
qpn, η
)
∂η
dz
=
∫ θ¯
θ
F (z)
f(z)
∂C
(
qpn, η
)
∂η
f(z)dz =Eθn
[
F (θn)
f(θn)
∂C
(
qpn, η
)
∂η
]
,
where the first equation is obtained by using integration by parts. Then by applying the above equa-
tion to (126) and the fact that {θn}n∈A are assumed to be random, independently and identically
distributed on support [θ, θ¯], we can get the conclusion. 
Based on Lemma 10, the principal’s problem thus reduces to choosing the desired effort qpn =
Qp(θn,θ−n) for each agent n∈A. We first consider the problem in (125) without the constraint. If
the optimal solution to this unconstrained problem is increasing, then it is also an optimal solution
to the constrained problem.
Let qpn =Q
p(θn,θ−n) and
M
(
qp1, . . . , q
p
N
)
=−Bp(qp)−∑
n∈A
C
(
qpn, θn
)−∑
n∈A
∂C
(
qpn, θn
)
∂θn
· F (θn)
f(θn)
.
As we assume that ∂2Bp(qp)/∂qpi ∂q
p
j > 0,∀j 6= i, ∂C(qpn, θn)/∂qpn > 0 and ∂2C(qpn, θn)/∂qpn∂θn ≥ 0,
we can check that
∂2M
∂qpi ∂q
p
j
=−∂
2Bp
(
qp
)
∂qpi ∂q
p
j
≤ 0, j 6= i,
∂2M
∂qpi
2 =−
∂2Bp
(
qp
)
∂qpi
2 − c(qpi , θi)−
∂c(qpi , θi)
∂θi
· F (θi)
f(θi)
≤ 0. (127)
Let G = [∂2M/∂qpi ∂q
p
j ], i, j = 1, . . . ,N , be the matrix of second order derivatives. Matrix G is
symmetric with negative diagonal terms as shown in (127).
As we can verify that, for k = 1, . . . ,N , the kth leading principal minors of G alternate in sign,
so that G is negative definite and W is strictly concave. The computational complexity of finding
the optimal solution of (125) will depend on the specific structure of the functions.
Using Cramer’s rule, the assumption that the c.d.f. function F is log concave in θ, and the
assumption that ∂C(qpi , θi)/∂q
p
i > 0 and ∂
2c(qpi , θi)/∂q
p
i ∂θi ≥ 0, we can verify that
∂Qp(θn,θ−n)
∂θn
=−∂
2M/∂qpn∂θn
∂2M/∂qpn
2 ≤ 0,∀n∈A, (128)
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which shows that Qp(θn,θ−n) derived by solving (125) is nonincreasing in θn, so that it is a feasible
solution of (125).
According to (119), we have
Eθ−n
[
pi(θn,θ−n)−C
(
Qp(θn,θ−n), θn
)]
=Eθ−n
[∫ θ¯
θn
∂C
(
Qp(z,θ−n), η
)
∂η
dz
]
.
From the above equation, we can derive the optimal payment function as given in (23).
Endnotes
1. We want to emphasize that whether the Bayes risk exists is a open problem. Scharf (1991),
Figueiredo (2004) consider some special case such as Gaussian distribution. Characterizing the
general condition for the existence and uniqueness of Bayes risk will be interesting future work.
2. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies how to incentivize all agents to
report their truthful estimations and exert appropriate amounts of effort based on their respective
capabilities during a prediction process. Hence, we have not found an algorithm in the existing
literature as a fair benchmark to compare with the COPE performance.
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